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ABSTRACT 
Use of Open Source Information and Commercial Satellite Imagery for Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Regime Compliance Verification by a Community of Academics. 
(August 2007) 
Alexander Solodov, M.S., Ural State Technical University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. William S. Charlton 
 
 
 
The proliferation of nuclear weapons is a great threat to world peace and 
stability. The question of strengthening the nonproliferation regime has been open for a 
long period of time. In 1997 the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of 
Governors (BOG) adopted the Additional Safeguards Protocol. The purpose of the 
protocol is to enhance the IAEA’s ability to detect undeclared production of fissile 
materials in member states. However, the IAEA does not always have sufficient human 
and financial resources to accomplish this task. Developed here is a concept for making 
use of human and technical resources available in academia that could be used to 
enhance the IAEA’s mission. 
The objective of this research was to study the feasibility of an academic 
community using commercially or publicly available sources of information and 
products for the purpose of detecting covert facilities and activities intended for the 
unlawful acquisition of fissile materials or production of nuclear weapons. In this study, 
the availability and use of commercial satellite imagery systems, commercial computer 
codes for satellite imagery analysis, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) 
iv 
verification International Monitoring System (IMS), publicly available information 
sources such as watchdog groups and press reports, and Customs Services information 
were explored. A system for integrating these data sources to form conclusions was also 
developed. The results proved that publicly and commercially available sources of 
information and data analysis can be a powerful tool in tracking violations in the 
international nuclear nonproliferation regime and a framework for implementing these 
tools in academic community was developed. 
As a result of this study a formation of an International Nonproliferation 
Monitoring Academic Community (INMAC) is proposed. This would be an independent 
organization consisting of academics (faculty, staff and students) from both nuclear 
weapon states (NWS) and non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS). This community 
analyzes all types of unclassified publicly and commercially available information to aid 
in detection of violations of the non-proliferation regime. INMAC shares all of this 
information with the IAEA and the public. Since INMAC is composed solely by 
members of the academic community, this organization would not demonstrate any 
biases in its investigations or reporting. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
I.A. Objective* 
Today the proliferation of nuclear weapons is a great threat to world peace and 
stability. Recent discoveries of several clandestine nuclear weapons programs in the 
countries that are signatories of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
(NPT) raises more concerns about the future of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and 
demonstrates an essential need for strengthening the regime. An additional concern is 
that a country after succeeding in developing a covert nuclear program may sell a 
weapon to a non-state actor or a terrorist group.  
In order to address all these concern, the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA), which historically was only performing verification of the member states’ 
compliance with their own declarations, is now expanding the use of open sources of 
information and commercial satellite imagery in order to enhance its ability to detect 
undeclared production of fissile material. However, the Agency does not always have 
sufficient human and financial resources to accomplish this task. The objective of this 
research was to study the feasibility of an academic community using commercially or 
publicly available sources of information and products for the purpose of detecting 
covert facilities and activities intended for the unlawful acquisition of fissile materials or 
                                                 
This dissertation follows the style of Nuclear Technology. 
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production of nuclear weapons. The availability and use of the following main potential 
sources of information were explored: 
1. commercial satellite imagery systems, 
2. commercial computer codes for satellite imagery analysis, 
3. Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) verification International Monitoring 
System (IMS), 
4. publicly available information sources such as watchdog groups and press 
reports, and 
5. Customs Services information.  
Another important task is extraction of the useful pieces from selected sources 
and combining them into a meaningful compilation. Collecting, organizing, determining 
associations, tracking, and drawing conclusions from a wide variety of information types 
can be a daunting task [1]. An algorithm for effective data integration was defined and 
proposed as a part of this project. This routine would allow segregation of information by 
the relation to the particular stage of the country’s weapons program and effectively 
estimating state’s covert activities progress. 
As a part of this research project, forming an International Nonproliferation 
Monitoring Academic Community (INMAC) is proposed. This would be an independent 
organization consisting of academics (faculty, staff and students) from both nuclear 
weapon states (NWS) and non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS). This community would 
analyze all types of unclassified publicly and commercially available information to aid 
in detection of violations of the nonproliferation regime. INMAC would share all of this 
3 
information with the IAEA and the public. Since INMAC would be composed solely by 
members of the academic community, this organization should be less prone to 
demonstrate any biases in its investigations or reporting. 
I.B. Possible Proliferation Routes 
There are several routes that a country dedicated to obtaining nuclear weapons 
can take. Manufacturing nuclear weapons, shown schematically in Fig. 1, is a complex 
and difficult process. It can be divided into three basic stages: (1) acquisition of special 
nuclear material (SNM), (2) weaponization of the SNM using non-nuclear components, 
(3) production of a delivery system for the weapon. The first, and most difficult, is the 
production of the special nuclear materials [Pu, 233U, or highly enriched uranium (HEU)] 
that are the heart of a nuclear warhead. SNM is composed of 239Pu, 233U, or 235U. These 
materials are called fissile materials, because their nuclei have a high probability to split, 
or fission, after absorption of a neutron regardless of the neutron energy. Basic fission 
weapons are made using some combination of fissile materials. Fissioning of those 
isotopes is accompanied by the release of tremendous amounts of energy and additional 
neutrons to sustain the chain reaction; this allows the use of those isotopes in nuclear 
reactors and gives nuclear weapons huge amounts of explosive power. 
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Fig. 1. Technical Routes to a Nuclear Capability. 
 
 
The magnitude of the mass of the fissile material needed to sustain a chain 
reaction in an explosive device is called the critical mass and is measured in kilograms 
for plutonium or 233U and tens of kilograms for enriched uranium (the exact size of 
critical mass depends on the conditions of the chain reaction initiation: pressure, purity of 
the material, density etc.). Fortunately, from the nonproliferation standpoint, special 
nuclear materials are not readily available in the nature and obtaining the necessary 
quantities of material requires a full-scale industrial process that uses advanced scientific 
technologies. One of the fathers of U.S. nuclear bomb, Edward Teller, said once: “As 
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soon as the country will be able to obtain nuclear material in necessary amount, creation 
of the nuclear weapon will be a question of several months” [2]. 
There is a principal difference in obtaining the types of material in the required 
quantity and quality: 
1. 235U exists in nature mixed with another uranium isotope (238U) in a very 
low mass concentration of about 0.7%. A special separative technology is 
required for enrichment of uranium in the 235U isotope to concentrations 
close to 90% (or at least about 20%). All of the proven technologies for 
uranium enrichment are based on a small (0.4%) mass difference between 
uranium isotopes.  
2. Plutonium is derived from the naturally occurring 238U isotope, which 
cannot be used directly in a nuclear weapon. Plutonium is created 
following a neutron capture by 238U and two beta-minus decays of 
intermediate nuclei. Therefore plutonium production requires irradiation 
of natural or depleted uranium with a high neutron flux and chemical 
separation of plutonium from uranium and fission products.  
3. Similar to plutonium, 233U for weapons can be derived from the naturally 
occurring thorium (232Th) isotope, which cannot be used directly in a 
nuclear weapon. 233U is created following a neutron capture by 232Th and 
two beta-minus decays of intermediate nuclei. Therefore 233U production 
requires irradiation of natural thorium with a high neutron flux and 
chemical separation of 233U and thorium afterwards.  However, unlike 
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plutonium production by neutron irradiation, the irradiation of thorium 
also produces another uranium isotope (232U) which decays to highly 
radioactive daughter products that complicate the use of 233U for 
producing nuclear weapons.  While this route is similar to the plutonium 
production route shown in Fig. 1, it is more complicated since thorium 
can not be made critical thus requiring an enriched uranium or plutonium 
seed fuel to irradiate the thorium and since the presence of 232U 
complicates the handling of the 233U without remote operations.  For these 
reasons, this route is not considered further herein. 
The second stage is weapon assembly. To make the enriched uranium or 
plutonium into a weapon, various additional components must be added:  
1. chemical explosives (or in the case of gun-type weapons, propellants) to 
assemble the nuclear material into a super-critical mass that will sustain 
an explosive chain reaction,  
2. nonfissile materials to reflect neutrons and tamp the explosion, 
3. electronics and detonators to trigger the explosives,  
4. a neutron generator (called an initiator) to start the nuclear detonation at 
an appropriate time, and  
5. associated command, control, and security circuitry. 
The third stage in developing a nuclear weapons capability is integrating the 
weapon with a delivery system and preparing for its use. The choice of a delivery method 
(aircraft, missile, etc.) is strongly dependant on the size of the weapon: the smaller the 
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weapon, the more advanced delivery vehicle can be used. In the case of a 
state-proliferator, there is a high probability that it will choose the path of modification 
of its existing ballistic missile or aircraft technologies or it will try to acquire the 
necessary expertise with external help.  
Based on this information a conclusion can be made that a potential proliferator 
has three options for acquiring fissile material needed for a nuclear weapon: (1) purchase 
or theft, (2) diversion from civilian nuclear activities in violation of IAEA safeguards, or 
(3) indigenous production in unsafeguarded facilities. 
Indigenous production of weapon-grade nuclear material requires a large, 
complex, and expensive set of specialized facilities, and the relevant facilities therefore 
represent principal “chokepoints” for controlling nuclear proliferation. Many different 
approaches to producing nuclear materials are available, depending on what nuclear 
materials a proliferator starts with, what access it has to dual-use or nuclear-specific 
technologies, and what cost it is willing to bear to acquire proscribed technologies on the 
black market. Various approaches also place specific demands on the proliferator’s 
technology base, infrastructure, and expertise, and pose different operational difficulties 
and risks of detection once acquired. 
I.C. The History of the Nonproliferation† Regime 
The history of the nuclear nonproliferation regime, and its evolution to the form 
in which it exists now, is more than 30 years old. After appearance of the first two 
nuclear powers (the United States of America and the Soviet Union), the world 
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community did not immediately realize the importance of stopping or freezing the 
process of new nuclear weapon states arising. Not until the end of the 1960s, when the 
group of countries possessing nuclear weapon had grown to five members, did the world 
community start to work on co-operational measures to prevent the spread of nuclear 
arms and create an international legal system for the nonproliferation regime. The result 
of these efforts led to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), 
which was open for signing on July 1, 1968 and came into force on March 5, 1970 [3]. 
The NPT though is mainly a philosophical document setting the baseline for the nuclear 
nonproliferation regime. Creation of the international system of mechanisms, norms and 
procedures followed after the creation of the treaty. All together, combined with the 
international safeguards and export controls systems, this formed the regime of 
nonproliferation of the nuclear weapons. 
I.C.1. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
The NPT represents the world’s single most important multilateral nuclear arms 
control agreement and it remains the most successful exemplar of arms control [4]. As of 
today the NPT has 188 member states and only 3 countries are not signatories of the 
Treaty: India, Pakistan and Israel. There is one country that used its right to withdraw 
from the Treaty: the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK). Five of the 
member states are nuclear weapon states (NWS): China, France, the Russian Federation, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States. All others are non-nuclear weapon states 
(NNWS). 
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The NPT consists of 11 articles: 
1. Article I states that NWS are obliged not to transfer to NNWS nuclear 
weapons, other nuclear explosives and control over such devices. Also 
NWS are obliged not to encourage or assist any of NNWS to acquire 
nuclear weapons; 
2. Article II states that each NNWS party undertakes not to receive or 
manufacture nuclear weapons or explosives; 
3. Article III outlines measures for the use of IAEA nuclear safeguards. 
Each NNWS will accept safeguards to be negotiated for the exclusive 
purpose of verifying the fulfillment of the party’s NPT obligations. 
4. Article IV guarantees the right of all states-parties to research, develop 
and produce nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. All the state parties 
have a right to exchange information and equipment (with other states) 
for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 
5. Article V states that each party of the treaty shall undertake measures 
to ensure to make available to NNWS parties any potential benefits of 
the application of “peaceful nuclear explosions”. NNWS parties shall 
be able to obtain such benefits through special agreements and an 
appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-
nuclear-weapon states. 
6. Article VI provides that “each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes 
to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to 
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cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear 
disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament 
under strict and effective international control.” 
7. Article VII provides that any group of states has the right “to conclude 
regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons 
in their respective territories”. 
8. Article VIII provides for NPT amendment procedure. 
9. Article IX provides the following: 
- any state may accede to the NPT at any time 
- ratification by signatory states shall be deposited with the U.S., the 
USSR and the U.K. (Depositary Governments) 
- the treaty shall be entered into force upon ratification by the three 
depositary states and forty other states 
- for states depositing their instruments of ratification after the NPT 
enters into force, it becomes applicable on the date of their accession 
- depositary governments shall promptly inform all states of: the date(s) 
of each signature(s), date(s) of deposit(s) of instruments of 
ratification, the date of receipt of any request for convening a 
conference and all other notices. 
10. Article X provides the withdrawal case: “Each Party shall in 
exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the 
Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject 
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matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its 
country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to 
the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in 
advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary 
events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.” Also 25 
years after the treaty enters into force a conference shall be convened 
to decide whether the treaty shall continue indefinitely, or shall be 
extended for an additional fixed period of time.  
11. Article XI establishes that text of the treaty in English, Russian, 
French, Spanish and Chinese, equally authentic, shall be deposited in 
the archives of the Depositary Governments.  Certified copies should 
be transmitted to the newly acceding states [3]. 
I.C.2. International Atomic Energy Agency 
The IAEA (often referred to simply as “the Agency”) was formed in 1957. The 
main goal of the Agency is assistance to the peaceful use of nuclear energy and assurance 
that it is not used for warfare. This goal was stated in Article II of the IAEA Statute. 
According to Article III of the Statute, the main functions of the IAEA are:  
1. to promote scientific and research work and development of the use of 
atomic energy for peaceful purposes;  
2. to provide services, materials, equipment and technical means;  
3. to contribute to the exchange of scientific and technical information and 
specialists;  
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4. to provide safeguards; and  
5. to establish norms of safety and health protection.  
The formation of the IAEA was a consequence of the “Atoms for Peace” speech 
to the United Nations (UN) by President Dwight D. Eisenhower which promoted the use 
of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. 
I.C.3. Safeguards Regime Evolution 
The history of the international safeguards regime is more than 40 years old and it 
has many stages of evolution. The overall progress of the safeguards regime is presented 
in Fig. 2. Major documents, dates, and covered areas of nuclear fuel cycle are described 
in this section. 
The first safeguards regime appeared almost 10 years earlier than the NPT. The 
first regulating document was INFCIRC/26 [5] issued in 1961. It was a first attempt to 
set the list of facilities and materials to be put under safeguards control. Basically, it 
covered low-powered reactors (less than 100 MW), most of which were research 
reactors.  
In 1962, the Agency started inspections of low-powered reactors, but soon the 
number of more powerful reactors started to increase rapidly. By 1963, it became clear 
that the safeguard system should be spread over reactors of all power levels. In 1965, the 
first revision of INFCIRC/66 was adopted. This document was applicable to all reactors. 
However, it did not consider facilities like enrichment plants, fuel fabrication plants and 
reprocessing plants. In 1968, the final version of the document numbered INFCIRC/66 
Rev.2 [6] was adopted. This system is still applied to a small number of facilities around 
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the world. In this document, the definition of ‘principal nuclear facilities’ appeared 
which related to types of facilities other than reactors, which may produce, process, or 
use safeguarded nuclear materials.  
 
 
 
Fig. 2. The Historical Progression of the Safeguards Regime [7]. 
 
14 
By the time the NPT was signed by the first parties a new system was needed 
which would cover not only particular materials or equipment but all nuclear activities of 
the state-party of the NPT. Such a system was actively developed by a committee 
consisting of the USA, USSR, and the United Kingdom. INFCIRC/153 [8] detailed a 
form of agreement between the IAEA and States (parties of the NPT) and was called the 
‘Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement’. This system has been a standard for the last 
quarter of the last century and is still implemented in many countries today. 
The main way of providing safeguards guarantees was accountancy of special 
nuclear materials. Each member state must create an accounting system and report to the 
IAEA. Measures of the Agency to control nuclear material include (1) the use of seals, 
surveillance equipment and other devices to trace the transfers of material and its 
movement and (2) confirming material balance at the particular facility. IAEA 
inspectors, having special privileges and immunities, periodically attend facilities to 
verify the physical inventory of material, changes to that inventory, the accuracy of the 
reports, and to take samples to be analyzed by the Agency. The results of the inspection 
are presented to the State by the Agency. If there is some evidence that some amount of 
material was diverted for non-peaceful use, then the IAEA Director General presents a 
report to the IAEA Board of Governors (BOG). If the BOG decides that the IAEA cannot 
verify the fact of diversion by itself, it reports to the UN Security Council.  
The INFCIRC/153 system was a product of difficult negotiations between those 
industrial NNWS which desired as little interference in the operation and cost of their 
nuclear power system as possible, and those states that attempted to create a verification 
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system to give effective early warning of any diversion from a civil fuel cycle. One 
consequence was that its focus was on the misuse of declared materials and known 
facilities, rather than searching for undeclared materials and plants. Another was that 
most of its inspection effort was focused upon Canada, Germany and Japan, even though 
by the 1980s they appeared to be unlikely candidates as prospective nuclear proliferators. 
A third was that “NWS made ‘voluntary offers’ to place elements of their civil industry 
under IAEA safeguards in order to engage in an exercise of ‘equality in misery’ with 
industrial NNWS in shouldering the burden of accepting IAEA safeguards” [9]. 
After the discovery of the clandestine nuclear weapon program in Iraq during the 
Gulf War in 1991, the IAEA undertook intensive efforts on strengthening the safeguards 
regime and preventing the development of covert weapon programs. In 1993, the BOG 
adopted the so-called “Program 93+2” [10] on the creation of a more efficient and cost-
effective safeguards regime. During the work on this program, it was confirmed that 
among the measures used as a part of existing legal authority should be:  
1. obtaining more detailed information on facilities, where nuclear materials 
were ever located or are planned to be located at any time;  
2. extensive use of undeclared inspections;  
3. environmental sampling in the places where inspectors have access to; 
and 
4. use of improved technologies for distant monitoring of nuclear materials 
transfers. 
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For the purpose of further strengthening the safeguards regime in May of 1997, 
the Border of Governors adopted a voluntary Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540) [11] to 
the IAEA Safeguard Agreements with parties to the NPT. The model protocol outlined 
four key changes that must be incorporated in each NPT state party’s safeguards 
agreement when the Additional Protocol is signed: 
1. The amount and type of information that states will have to provide to the 
IAEA is greatly expanded. In addition to the current requirement for data 
about nuclear fuel and fuel-cycle activities, states will now have to 
provide an “expanded declaration” on a broad array of nuclear-related 
activities, such as “nuclear fuel cycle-related research and development 
activities not involving nuclear materials” and “the location, operational 
status and the estimated annual production” of uranium mines and 
thorium concentration plants. All trade in items on the Nuclear Suppliers 
Group trigger list will have to be reported to the IAEA as well. 
2. The number and types of facilities that the IAEA will be able to inspect 
and monitor are substantially increased beyond the previous level. In 
order to resolve questions about, or inconsistencies in, the information a 
state has provided on its nuclear activities, the new inspection regime 
provides IAEA with “complementary”, or preapproved, access to “any 
location specified by the Agency,” as well as all of the facilities specified 
in the “expanded declaration.” By negotiating an Additional Protocol, 
states will, in effect, guarantee the IAEA access on short notice to all of 
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their declared (and, if necessary, undeclared) facilities in order “to assure 
the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.” 
3. Inspectors should be guaranteed to be able to obtain multi-entry visas 
within a month and have access to modern means of communication. 
4. The Additional Protocol provides the IAEA the right to use environmental 
sampling during inspections at both declared and undeclared sites. It 
further permits the use of environmental sampling over a wide area rather 
than being confined to specific facilities. 
As of November of 2006, the Additional Protocol was signed by 110 nations. 
Though the Additional Protocol greatly strengthens the IAEA’s ability to verify that 
NNWS that are parties to the NPT use nuclear facilities only for peaceful purposes, it 
cannot prevent a determined state from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability [12]. 
I.D. Nonproliferation Regime Successes 
The main success of the NPT is that the Treaty created and established an 
international legal base for the nuclear nonproliferation regime and created beneficial 
stimulus for those countries that want to remain free of nuclear weapons [13]. The NPT, 
and the atmosphere in the world created by the Treaty, played one of the main roles in 
the fact that after the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, nuclear weapons were never 
again used in combat.  
The Treaty became the largest (in number of parties) arms control treaty. It has 
188 member states, 183 of which are NNWS. Originally, the NPT was negotiated to be 
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in force for 25 years (until 1995). In 1995, the NPT Review Conference was held and the 
Treaty was extended indefinitely.  
The overwhelming majority of states decided that their security interests are 
better served by not having nuclear weapons. Some states gave up nuclear weapons 
capabilities not even starting weapon programs; others reversed themselves at different 
stages of their quest for a nuclear weapon capability. Canada was the first state that had 
the capacity to make nuclear arms to renounce such a capacity. Among others, that under 
different circumstances gave up their ambitions or capabilities, are Australia, Argentina, 
Belarus, Brazil, Italy, Kazakhstan, Libya, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, and 
Ukraine. 
Historical results of nuclear weapon programs of different countries are presented 
in Fig. 3. In the 1960s, 23 countries had weapons, were conducting weapons-related 
research, or were discussing the pursuit of nuclear weapons: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, 
Canada, China, Egypt, France, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Norway, Romania, South 
Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, United Kingdom, United States, USSR, and 
Yugoslavia. In the 1980s, 19 countries had weapons or were conducting weapons-related 
research: Argentina, Brazil, Canada, China, France, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Libya, North 
Korea, Pakistan, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, United Kingdom, United States, 
USSR, and Yugoslavia. In 2005, in addition to the 8 states with nuclear weapons, Iran 
and North Korea are suspected of having active nuclear weapons programs [12]. 
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Fig. 3. Countries with Nuclear Weapons or Programs (Number of Programs) [12]. 
 
South Africa’s decision to destroy its six nuclear explosive devices as well as its 
weapons infrastructure and then join the NPT as a NNWS was unprecedented. It 
reflected changes in political dynamics and threat perceptions and also gave an example 
to others. Another special case was created by the three successor states to the USSR: 
Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. Those countries did not pursue nuclear weapon 
capabilities, but accidentally became de facto NWS after the breakup of the Soviet 
Union, which left nuclear warheads on their territory. They did not have either resources 
or capabilities to maintain a status as a nuclear-weapon state. They agreed to the removal 
of former Soviet nuclear weapons from their territory by a combination of financial 
inducements, security guarantees, and political considerations [4].  
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Fig. 4 shows the timeline for the number of countries with nuclear weapons. As 
can be seen from this graph, the number of nuclear weapon states grew rapidly during the 
first 25 years after the test of the first nuclear device. After the NPT came into force in 
1970 the curve sharply leveled off and turned closer to a flat line until the recent nuclear 
weapons tests by Pakistan and the DPRK. This plot is another example in favor of the 
arguments about successes of NPT, but it also raises a question if the world is entering a 
new era of proliferation.  
 
Fig. 4. Historical Progression of the Number of Countries with Nuclear Weapons. 
 
As another measure to prevent the emergence of new NWS was the creation of a 
concept of nuclear-weapons-free zones (NWFZs). NWFZs have become to be recognized 
by the international community as a part of a phased approach to the process of nuclear 
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arms controls and disarmament. In this regard, all existing NWFZ arrangements have a 
number of common characteristics: 
1. a legal obligation to place all nuclear material and installations under 
full-scope IAEA safeguards; 
2. to clearly demarcate the geographic limits of the zone of application in 
the territories of member states; 
3. to specify the obligations, rights and responsibilities of contracting and 
protocol parties; 
4. to promote international cooperation in the peaceful applications of 
nuclear energy under safeguards; and 
5. to give indefinite duration  to the NWFZ treaties. 
In contrast to the NPT, NWFZs do not permit the “stationing” of nuclear weapons 
on the territories of states parties or “nuclear sharing”‡ arrangements among NWS and 
NNWS. Currently more than 100 NNWS are parties to NWFZ treaties [4]. 
The NPT became a core, around which other multi-region and international 
mechanisms and agreements were created to help nuclear nonproliferation including:  
1. Nuclear Suppliers Group [14],  
2. Zangger Committee [15],  
3. Convention of physical protection of nuclear materials [16],  
4. Treaties on creation of nuclear-free zones in Latin America, the South 
Pacific, South-Eastern Asia and Africa [17, 18, 19, 20],  
                                                 
‡ Under “nuclear sharing” agreements besides stationing of nuclear weapons on the NNWS territory, the 
control over them may also be transferred to the NNWS. 
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5. bilateral Argentine-Brazil verification organization [21], and  
6. others. 
With the help of the NPT it became possible to create a comprehensive 
safeguards regime. The purpose of this regime is to prevent nuclear materials used in 
peaceful programs to be transferred to any military program and to be used for the 
fabrication of a nuclear weapon of any kind. The safeguards regime is being improved 
constantly and now it is the most broad and technically advanced international control 
and verification system.  
Unanimous adoption by the UN Security Council of the resolution 1540 
(2004) [22], allowing the creation of effective barriers preventing nonstate organization 
(terrorists) from obtaining weapons of mass destruction including their components or 
means of delivery, was another big success for the nonproliferation regime. Resolution 
1540 requires all states to “establish, develop, review and maintain appropriate effective 
national and trans-shipment controls” and “border controls” to prevent proliferation of 
nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their means of delivery. States must enact 
“appropriate laws and regulations to control export, transit, trans-shipment and re-
export” of materials that would contribute to proliferation. “The primary advantage of the 
resolution over treaties addressing similar matters is that it is binding on all U.N. member 
states, including those outside the scope of the nonproliferation regime and those non-
nuclear states that serve as reexport and manufacturing points in the proliferation 
network” [12]. 
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Recently another international instrument was added to the list of measures taken 
by the world community to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The 
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) was declared by President George W. Bush in May 
of 2003 [23]. The initiative aims to stop shipments of biological, chemical, and nuclear 
weapons, as well as missiles and goods that could be used to deliver or produce such 
weapons, to terrorists and countries suspected of trying to acquire WMD. Initiative 
participants intend to carry out cargo interdictions at sea, in the air, or on land. PSI is 
limited solely to seizing shipments of WMD and dual-use goods (items that have both 
civilian, peaceful purposes and that can be used to make weapons) to those countries and 
nonstate actors viewed as threats by PSI participants. Today 15 states have joined this 
initiative and more than 60 states have agreed to provide assistance. The initiative goals 
are: detection, prevention and interdiction of unlawful transition of WMD related 
materials, including elimination of the existing “black market” of those materials. 
An important conclusion that can be made as a result of the international 
consensus against the proliferation of nuclear arms and the more than 30-year history of 
the NPT is the appearance and development of a “nonproliferation culture and 
mentality”. Almost all bilateral or multilateral talks on world security include discussions 
of nuclear nonproliferation problems, often those questions are central on the 
program [24]. Even if a country chooses to acquire nuclear weapons it has to be done 
secretly and covertly, which makes it much harder and more expensive. If the secret 
program is discovered, it is likely a violation of international laws and norms and can 
result in sanctions or even military actions. 
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I.E. Nonproliferation Regime Difficulties and Failures 
One of the main issues, creating confrontation since the NPT’s entry into force is 
the problem of nuclear arsenal reduction and eventual elimination by NWS as stated in 
Article VI of the Treaty. Even though there are some significant efforts by the US and 
Russia on cutting their arsenals, the two countries still have tremendous amounts of 
nuclear weapons. There probably will be more reductions in the future, but their 
complete elimination is very unlikely. Also, other NWS (China, France and Great 
Britain) have no intentions on stockpile reduction, and China is in fact moving in the 
opposite direction: creating more nuclear weapons. If the US and Russia’s stockpiles will 
remain on the same level, many nations will conclude that the weapon states’ promise to 
reduce and eventually eliminate these arsenals has been broken. NNWS may therefore 
feel released from their pledge not to acquire nuclear arms. 
 Additionally, there appears to be growing acceptance of the nuclear status of 
India and Pakistan, with each country acquiring prestige and increased attention from 
leading nuclear weapon states, including the United States. There is an argument that a 
nuclear Iran or North Korea could also be absorbed into the international system without 
serious consequence. If the number of states having nuclear weapons increases, NWS fail 
to comply with their original disarmament obligations, and countries like India and 
Pakistan gain status for having nuclear weapons, it is possible that major non-nuclear 
nations will reconsider their nuclear choices. Most nations will continue to eschew 
nuclear weapons for technological and economic reasons, but others might decide that 
nuclear weapons are necessary to improve their security or status. There is a real 
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possibility, under these conditions, of a systemwide collapse of the nonproliferation 
regime [12]. 
The NPT has already been severely threatened by the development in several 
states of facilities for enriching uranium and reprocessing plutonium. Although each state 
has asserted these facilities for civilian use only, the resulting supplies of nuclear 
materials give each country a “virtual” nuclear weapon capability. This situation greatly 
erodes the confidence that states can have in a neighbor’s non-nuclear pledge. 
During the last 15 years a new kind of challenge to the nonproliferation regime 
appeared: countries with clandestine nuclear weapon production programs. One of the 
first cases of a covert program was revealed in Iraq during the first Gulf War. It was the 
first discovery of a broad-scale program in a country which was a signatory of the NPT. 
Iraq (and the later cases of the DPRK, Libya and Iran) proved that the existing 
safeguards regime is not always effective (especially for detection of undeclared nuclear 
activities). One of the main reasons for safeguards regime failures is limited resources of 
the IAEA. The Agency is experiencing the lack of both human and financial assets. For 
example, the total budget of the IAEA for the year 2005 was 268.7 million dollars, and 
almost 38% of it was spent on nuclear verification work. It is important to point out that 
the majority of this money is spent on monitoring large nuclear installations in countries 
that are not likely to pursue a nuclear weapon capability such as Japan, Canada and 
major European countries. Very small amounts are left for searching for undeclared 
facilities and clandestine activities. As an example of the lack of human resources, the 
creation of an operational unit with limited imagery analysis capabilities [the Satellite 
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Imagery Analysis Laboratory (SIAL)] can be mentioned. The unit was established in 
2000 and as of right now there are two image analysts, one geospatial database 
administrator and one general staff support person in place in the SIAL [25], which is 
clearly not enough for full-scale monitoring for illegal nuclear activities throughout the 
world. 
Another major issue of concern is that as time goes by it may become harder and 
harder to find common points between NPT parties and reach agreements on various 
problems. In May of 2005, the NPT Review Conference took place in New York. 
“Delegates from 153 countries failed to build on past agreements and adopt any kind of 
decision or recommendations for further progress in the vital security issues of nuclear 
nonproliferation and disarmament. From start to finish, this conference did little more 
than go through the motions, and was one the most shameful exhibitions of cynical time-
wasting seen outside the Geneva Conference on Disarmament” [26]. This conference did 
not bring any relief of hope for the future development of the nonproliferation regime. 
Representatives of NPT member states spent most of the time arguing about the agenda 
and by the time some sort of agreement was reached the conference was over.  
 These facts indicate that the nonproliferation regime is strained and there is a 
need for some new ideas and new forces. The number of countries that decide to choose 
the route of obtaining nuclear weapons for the improvement of their regional and 
international position is growing. They use the inability of the IAEA to present credible 
proofs of their violations and complicated mechanisms of reaching the decision to apply 
UN sanctions against them. Sometimes when information on clandestine programs is 
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coming from intelligence services of one of the member’s government, many argue that 
this evidence was provided for the benefit of the country disclosing information. The 
IAEA is performing well on monitoring of currently declared facilities, but does not have 
sufficient resources to keep up with the growing number of illegal weapon programs and 
discovering them in a timely manner. As the result of those difficulties and 
disagreements between member states, the popularity of the Agency and trust in the 
future of the NPT are declining. In this situation, a new independent international 
organization that can provide sufficient resources and help to the IAEA and nuclear 
nonproliferation regime as a whole seems to be one of the solutions for the improvement 
and future development of NPT and gives a hope for a safer future. 
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CHAPTER II 
INMAC CONCEPT 
II.A. Introduction 
Good verification aims at early detection, to provide sufficient warning of a 
potential or actual violation, so that other parties can take action before the violation 
becomes militarily significant [27]. As one way of improving the nonproliferation 
regime, an additional organization to aid in providing NPT verification is proposed: the 
International Nonproliferation Monitoring Academic Community (INMAC). INMAC 
would be a society of academics including students, faculty and staff from both Nuclear-
Weapon States and Non-Nuclear Weapon States. In addition to all existing monitoring 
means, an academic community will provide mechanism of monitoring for proliferation 
activities. It will help in early detection and building a picture of the scale of undeclared 
weapons programs. Since INMAC is composed solely of members of the academic 
community, this organization demonstrates less bias in its investigations or reporting. 
This community would also provide means for educating the future generation of 
nonproliferation leaders throughout the world and increased manpower for monitoring 
for proliferation activities. 
II.B. Nonproliferation Academic Institutions and Nongovernmental Organizations 
There are several existing nonproliferation private nongovernmental and 
academic organizations around the world. Among the major ones are: the Center for 
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Non-Proliferation Studies (Monterey Institute of International Studies, US), the Global 
Security Programme (Cambridge University, UK), Bochum Verification Project (Institut 
fuer Experimentalphysik III, Germany), and the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies 
(Israel). Most of these organizations are research centers specializing in arms controls or 
international security issues. Usually they are small and even being nongovernmental 
they are still centered on issues related to the host-country.  
There are also several professional international communities that are dedicating 
their resources to aid the IAEA. Among these networks are: International Network of 
Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation (INESAP) [28], Independent Group of 
Scientific Experts (iGSE) on the detection of clandestine nuclear-weapon-usable material 
production [29], and International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM) [30]. These 
organizations consist of professional engineers and scientists. The main goal of these 
networks is research and development of innovative monitoring and verification 
methods. For example, iGSE “has been formed to develop and demonstrate technologies 
and procedures for remote environmental sampling for clandestine nuclear-weapon-
usable materials production and other novel methodologies” [29]. 
INMAC, on the other hand, would be created as an international community of 
academics from all over the world, providing resources for open-source verification 
activities, ways of communication, exchange of ideas and findings, and co-operation in 
research. The community of academics will be more technical-based than policy-based 
and will also provide a framework for verification of nonproliferation monitoring results 
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of small research groups within the community. One of the goals of INMAC is to help 
existing organizations link together and form a backbone for the future community.  
II.C. Available Sources of Information 
All unclassified, publicly and commercially available sources of information and 
data analysis are proposed to be used by INMAC for the detection of undeclared illegal 
activities intended for the acquisition of fissile materials for nuclear weapons. Among 
available sources of information and data analysis, the most significant are: commercial 
satellite imagery systems, commercial computer codes for satellite imagery analysis, 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) verification International Monitoring System 
(IMS), publicly available information such as watchdog groups and press reports, and 
custom services information. Combinations of analyzed information obtained from those 
sources can create a picture of a country’s intentions and the scale of its weapons 
program. 
II.C.1. Commercial Satellite Imagery 
The use of data acquired by commercial satellites for the verification of the NPT 
was suggested as early as 1987. Furthermore, the usefulness of multispectral and radar 
image data for the determination of the operating status of nuclear installations was also 
demonstrated in 1998. Information gathered from space played an important role in
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uncovering the nuclear activities of, for example, Iraq, Iran and North Korea. The non-
intrusive nature of observations from space adds to its attractiveness [25]. 
Since the launch of the first civil remote sensing satellite (Landsat 1) by the USA 
in 1972, the quality of images, measured in terms of the resolution of a sensor, from 
subsequent civil satellites has improved some 100 fold [25]. There are more than 30 
programs in 9 countries existing today: USA, Russia, France, India, Israel, Japan, 
Canada, and Brazil/China. Currently, there is a variety of different types of remote 
sensing data available commercially including panchromatic, multispectral, 
hyperspectral, infrared, thermal and radar imagery. For panchromatic imagery, available 
spatial resolution is up to 0.6 meters. Prices of satellite imagery greatly vary depending 
on the type of imagery and the owner of the sensor. The cost of the 0.6 meter resolution 
data starts from $18 per km2. Most of the companies have special educational discount 
programs. Table I shows some of the current and future commercial satellite systems. 
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TABLE I  
Some Current and Future Commercial Remote Sensing Programs Belonging to Different 
Countries 
 
Resolution in pixel size (m) Country Satellite Date of launch of 
first satellite Panchromatic Multispectral Thermal/IR 
OPTICAL 
Brazil/China  
Zi Yuan CBERS I 
& II 
 
 
1999-2001 
 
 
20 
 
 
80 
 
 
160 
CBERS III & IV - 5 20 40-80 
France  
SPOT-4  
 
1998 
 
10 
 
20 
 
SPOT-5  2002 2.5 10  
India 
IRS-1C,-1D  
 
1995, 1997 
 
5.8 
 
23.5 
 
70.5 
IRS-P5 1999-2000 2.5   
Israel 
Eros-A  
 
2000 
 
2 
  
Japan 
ALOS 
 
2003 
 
2.5 
 
10 
 
Russia 
Resurs-F series 
 
1989-98 
 
2-3, 5-8 
 
15-30 
 
USA 
KH-1 to 4  
KH-4A  
KH-4B 
KH-6  
 
June1959-Dec 63  
Aug1963-Oct 69  
Sept1967-May 72 
March1963-July 63 
 
7.6 
2.7 
1.8 
1.8 
 
 
 
 
30 
 
 
 
 
120 
Landsat-5 1984  30 (bands 1-5,7) 120 (band 
6) 
Landsat-7 15 April 99 15 30 (bands 1-5, 7) 60 (band 6) 
IKONOS-1 
IKONOS -2 
did not achieve orbit 
1999 
 
1 
 
4 
 
4 
Quickbird-1 
Quickbird-2 
Failed 2000 
2001 
 
0.61 
 
2.44-2.88 
 
Orbview-3 
Orbview-4  
Orbview-5 
2000 
did not achieve orbit 
sch. for early 2007 
1-2 
1-2 
0.41 
4  
4 & hyperspectral 8 
1.64 
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TABLE I (continued) 
Resolution in pixel size (m) Country Satellite Date of launch of 
first satellite Panchromatic Multispectral Thermal/IR 
Earlybird-1  
ASTER  
 
EO-1 
1997  
18 December 99 
 
21 November 2000 
3 
 
 
10 
15 
15 (bands1-3), 
30m (bands 4-9) 
30 (9 bands) 
30 (220 bands) 
 
90 (bands 10-14) 
RADAR     
ESA 
ERS-1, & -2 
 
1991 & 1995 
 
25 
  
Japan 
JERS-1 
 
1992 
 
18 
  
Canada 
Radarsat 
 
1995 
 
8-100 
  
Russia 
Almaz-1B 
 
1998 
 
5-7, 15, 30 
 
170 
 
600 
USA 
SIR-C 
 
1994 
 
8-30 
  
 
An example of high-resolution satellite imagery is presented in Fig. 5. This is an 
image of the Uranium Enrichment Plant at Rokkasho (Aomori prefecture, Japan) 
acquired on June 25, 2002 by the QuickBird sensor owned by DigitalGlobe, Inc. It has 
0.6-meter spatial resolution which allows extracting most of the features of the plant 
including outer and inner fence lines, main entrance gate, main facility buildings, 
administrative building, storage tanks, switch yard and electric line pole.  
Recently a number of online services, offering browsing of high-resolution 
satellite imagery of the whole globe appeared. Among those services are Google 
Earth [31], TerraFly [32], TerraServer.com [33] and others. During the last several years 
the price of this service has been constantly decreasing and now most of those imagery 
libraries can be accessed for free. 
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Fig. 5. Uranium Enrichment Plant at Rokkasho Acquired on June 25, 2002 by QuickBird 
Sensor Owned by DigitalGlobe, Inc. 
 
II.C.2. Imagery Analysis Computer Codes 
There is a variety of commercially available computer codes for satellite imagery 
analysis and interpretation, such as ENVI [34], ERDAS [35], SilverEye [36], IDRISI 
[37] and others. Capabilities of these software tools are improving every day. The most 
rapidly developing and promising are spectral analysis tools. They allow defining 
materials of interest and ‘mapping’ those materials on an image, allowing feature 
extraction (such as hidden troops). There are also features that allow measuring 
dimensions of the objects and distances between them, creating 3D models from stereo-
pair images and now it is possible to create a 3D surface model (site fly-through) out of a 
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single 2D image. A number of tutorials, books, and training courses for imagery analysis 
can also be found. 
II.C.3. International Monitoring System 
The International Monitoring System (IMS) is a network of monitoring sensors 
which search for, detect and provide evidence of possible nuclear explosions to States 
Parties for verification of Treaty compliance. It consists of 321 monitoring stations and 
16 radionuclide laboratories that monitor the Earth for evidence of a nuclear explosion. 
Raw data from the stations are transmitted to the International Data Centre (IDC). The 
IDC processes the raw data received from the stations to derive objective products and 
services which support the treaty verification responsibilities of States [38]. 
The IMS uses seismic, hydroacoustic and infrasound monitoring technologies to 
detect the transient signals created when the energy is released in underground, 
underwater and atmosphere environments, respectively. Radionuclide monitoring 
technologies collect and analyze air samples for evidence of the physical products 
created and carried by the winds.  
The radionuclide network of 80 stations uses air samplers to detect radioactive 
particles released from atmospheric explosions or vented from underground and 
underwater explosions. The relative abundance of different radionuclides in air samples 
can distinguish between materials produced by a nuclear reactor and a nuclear explosion. 
IMS radionuclide laboratories analyze samples that are suspected of containing 
radionuclide materials that may have been produced by a nuclear explosion. Half of the 
stations in the radionuclide network also have the capacity to detect noble gases. For 
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INMAC, the presence of noble gases is particularly important in detecting releases from 
reprocessing plants and reactors. The IMS network has sensitivities on a global scale far 
better than any radionuclide monitoring system previously available [38]. 
The verification technologies of the International Monitoring System (IMS) and 
the data, technologies and products of the International Data Centre (IDC) have the 
potential to offer a range of useful civil and scientific applications which could contribute 
to sustainable development and human welfare. These civil and scientific applications 
demonstrate, in part, how States Signatories could gain additional benefits from 
participation in the Treaty verification regime. In May 2002, a group of fifteen senior 
scientific experts gathered in London to identify and examine the potential civil and 
scientific applications of the Treaty verification technologies [39]. This list includes: 
– Worldwide background radioactivity levels 
– Historical studies of pollutants and micro-organisms 
– Weather forecasting 
– Meteorological studies of the dispersion of airborne pollutants and global air 
mass movements 
– Atmospheric tracer studies  
– Critical information on nuclear accidents 
INMAC could be added to the other applications that could use CTBT data for 
beneficial purposes. 
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II.C.4. Watchdog Groups 
Watchdog groups and groups opposing current regimes inside countries of 
interest can be a great source of valuable information. For example, Iran’s nuclear 
weapon development program became known to the world with the help of the National 
Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), a group of Iranian exiles opposed to the current 
regime in their native country. Another organization is Iran of Tomorrow Movement 
(IOTM). The main goal of this organization is to eliminate the roots of terrorism 
worldwide, by supporting the people of Iran for the removal of the Islamic Republic in 
Iran and the establishment of freedom, human rights, and a democratic, secular, and 
modern government in Iran [40].  
Depending on the nature of information provided by watchdog groups it can be 
used by INMAC for various purposes, for example as a trigger for the initiation of an 
investigation of a particular country or a particular facility.   
II.C.5. Custom Services Information 
There is an enormous amount of information collected by customs services all 
over the world. Usually both shipping and receiving countries keep records on all 
shipments taking place. This information is available and can be helpful for INMAC in 
building a picture of a country’s clandestine nuclear weapons program. The difficulty 
with using customs services information is that there is a tremendous amount of data. 
Ways of sorting and extracting useful pieces of data are needed and research in that area 
would a part of INMAC’s mission. 
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II.C.6. Other Available Sources 
Among other available sources of information are press reports, the internet, 
university and public libraries, and various computer codes (air dispersion models, etc.). 
These sources can provide useful information on a country’s profile, various technical 
data, computational means, etc. 
The Internet has changed forever the manner in which individuals might carry out 
global research. Recent studies have shown that there are over 250,000 databases now 
available within the “deep web”. While the Internet’s value is growing, some caution 
should be used about the source and bias of materials found there. In general, the Internet 
can provide two benefits to the Academic Community: (1) as a means of rapidly 
communicating with counterparts around the world, primarily to exchange information 
and professional insights; and (2) as a means of rapidly accessing both free and 
commercial information sources [1]. 
 There are numerous commercial online sources, that is, sources that charge either 
a subscription fee or a usage fee for access to their information. These sources represent 
decades worth of editorial selection, authentication, formatting, indexing, abstracting, 
and presentation management. In general, source material obtained through a commercial 
online premium service has been created by a reputable commercial enterprise subject to 
scrutiny and judgment of the marketplace. Several examples of such online premium 
sources are described in Table II [1]. 
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TABLE II 
Examples of Commercial Online Premium Sources 
 
Name FACTIVA LEXIS-NEXIS DIALOG 
Link www.factiva.com www.lexis-nexis.com www.dialog.com 
Description User-friendly web-based 
interface, easy means of 
searching all available 
publications. Archive of 
publications varies, but 
typically provides several 
years worth of historical file. 
Includes Jane’s Information 
Group material as well as 
BBC transcripts. 
Two separate channels, one 
focuses on legal sources 
including public records 
(primarily in the United 
States but very helpful in 
tracing real estate, aircraft, 
and water craft including 
international ships), the 
other focused on news 
sources, offering archive 
access, i.e. ability to reach 
back several years or more 
on any topic. 
A very large collection of 
various commercial 
offerings that can be 
searched “by the file”. 
Especially valuable for 
access to conference 
proceedings, academic and 
policy journals, 
dissertations, book 
reviews, and the Social 
Science Citation Index 
(SSCI). 
Pricing Flat fee or actual cost pricing. Flat fee, actual cost, or pay 
at you go credit card 
pricing. 
Flat fee, actual cost, or pay 
as you go credit card 
pricing. 
 
Grey literature is that information that is both legally and ethically available, but 
only from specialized channels or through direct local access. It is generally understood 
as that information whose distribution is not controlled by commercial publishers, and/or 
that information that is not published, distributed, catalogued or acquired through 
commercial booksellers and subscription agencies. Grey literature includes working 
papers, pre-prints, technical reports and technical standards documents, dissertations, 
data sets, etc. Producers of grey literature include: non-profit and educational 
organizations, commercial enterprises creating documents for internal use as well as for 
clients and suppliers, and a wide variety of informal and formal associations, societies, 
and clubs [1].  
Special Libraries Association (SLA) is a professional association for librarian and 
information professionals working in organizations, companies, governments, and 
40 
academic institutions. Examples of special libraries include law libraries, news libraries, 
corporate libraries, museum libraries, and medical libraries. SLA was founded in 1909 in 
the United States. It is now an international organization with over 11,000 members in 
over 80 countries. Members of the SLA typically possess a master's degree in library 
science, but not necessarily for the purpose of library management. Given the rapid 
adoption of technologies for selecting, analyzing, managing, storing, and delivering 
information and knowledge, the average SLA member might be performing a range of 
services and employing a diverse mix of skills related to, but not exclusive of, library 
science. Unlike academic librarians or municipal librarians most persons working in a 
special library (or documentation center) work alone, without colleagues. Their budget is 
often smaller, their target audience more restricted and their collection much more 
limited in scope. The association is organized into subject-related divisions, geographic 
chapters, and special interest caucuses. Association activities include conferences, 
professional education, networking and advocacy [1]. 
II.D. Conclusions 
Open sources of information are playing a more important role in monitoring 
several weapons elimination and arms control treaties including the NPT. Growing 
number of available sources, especially in electronic form, level of detail, and expanding 
global communication technologies, provide an extremely powerful toolkit to the IAEA 
and various interested research groups. At the same time, the rapidly growing amount of 
information poses another problem of increasing need in manpower for effective data 
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search and analysis. Traditionally professional analysts associate open source 
information analysis with a number of challenges [1]:  
1. Scarcity of information. Sometimes there is little information available on a 
particular individual, organization, or activity.  
2. Information overload. Sometimes the vast amount of information available on 
a particular topic requires advanced analysis techniques and careful selection 
to concentrate the highest priority, most reliable information.  
3. Language barriers. The most detailed information is often found in the native 
language of the country under investigation. Such complications also 
complicate forming effective information search strategies.  
4. Information analysis. Collecting, organizing, determining associations, 
tracking, and drawing conclusions from a wide variety of information types 
can be a daunting task [1].  
The proposed community of academics, which would be composed of a number 
of researchers, would have several advantages over individuals or a small group of 
analysts. Collaborative efforts of community members would help to minimize and 
sometimes even completely eliminate most of the challenges described above: 
1. Scarcity of information. Having members of the community in different 
countries around the world expands the amount of information and the 
number of sources that the community as a whole has access to. 
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2. Information overload. Almost unlimited human resources in the universities 
and schools around the world would provide enough workforce for sorting 
out and overcoming the information overload. 
3. Language barriers. Variety of community members with different origins 
will provide language capabilities for all widely used languages. 
4. Information analysis. The size of the community and the variety of expertise 
of its members would provide necessary resources and mechanisms for 
effective data analysis and compilation. 
INMAC would provide an effective addition to the current nonproliferation 
regime, however, several impediments exist to the formation of such a community. In 
following chapters a framework for INMAC is developed which will help to address 
these impediments. Also, case studies will be developed to demonstrate the viability of 
tools available for academics to assist in nuclear monitoring 
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CHAPTER III 
SATELLITE IMAGERY ANALYSIS 
III.A. Background 
Since the 1960s, satellite capabilities had been used by the US and USSR for 
monitoring each other and the rest of the world. In the 1990s, commercial satellite 
imagery (panchromatic, multispectral, hyperspectral, infrared, thermal and radar) became 
available to the general public. During the last decade, commercial satellite imagery 
quality advanced dramatically and its spatial resolution reached values of 0.4 - 0.6 
meters. Satellite imagery already has a long history as a valuable tool for non-intrusive 
treaty verification and now it is gaining its status as a great resource for use by the IAEA 
and other international organizations for the purpose of monitoring for nuclear 
nonproliferation regime violations. This chapter explores current commercially availably 
remote sensing technologies and the feasibility of use of these capabilities by a 
community of academics. 
III.B. Overview of Existing Remote Sensing Technologies 
Remote sensing is a technology for sampling electromagnetic radiation to acquire 
and interpret geospatial data from which to extract information about features, objects, 
and classes on the Earth’s land surface, oceans, and atmosphere. Most remote sensing 
data consist of receiving and measuring reflected and/or emitted radiation from different 
parts of electromagnetic spectrum. Those parts of the spectrum most commonly sampled 
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are the ultraviolet, visible, reflected infrared, thermal infrared and microwave segments. 
Depending on a segment of the spectrum utilized there are several remote sensor 
technologies: panchromatic, multispectral, hyperspectral, thermal infrared, radar.  
Panchromatic is usually a term describing a type of black-and-white 
photographic film that is sensitive to all wavelengths of visible light. A panchromatic 
film therefore produces a realistic image of a scene. For satellite imagery it is a single 
image taken of all wavelengths within the visible spectrum, though not uniformly [41].  
Multispectral are usually two or more images taken simultaneously, but each 
image taken in a different part of the electromagnetic spectrum or, in other words, it is 
closely related, multiband data that consist of radiation collected over sets of 
electromagnetic radiation that individually extend over (usually narrow) intervals of 
countinuous wavelength within some part of the spectrum. Each interval makes up a 
band or channel identified by a color (if in the visible), a descriptive label (e.g. Near IR), 
or a specified range of wavelengths. Usually multispectral images have around 4-7 bands 
[41]. 
Hyperspectral is simultaneous acquisition of images of the same area in many 
(usually 100 or more), narrow, contiguous, spectral bands. The preferred term is 
“imaging spectroscopy” [41]. 
Radar imagery technology is based on the detection of the amplitude of 
microwave electromagnetic pulses that are transmitted from and scattered back to an 
antenna aboard the spacecraft [41].  
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There are a few important terms widely used for description of satellite imagery 
parameters that are necessary to be defined in this text:  
• The spatial resolution of an imaging system is expressed as the area of the 
ground represented by one pixel. Spatial resolution is also viewed as the 
clarity of high frequency detail information available in the image. As the 
spatial resolution increases the details in an image are clearer. 
• The instantaneous field of view (IFOV) is the ground area sensed by 
sensor at a given instant in time. The spatial resolution is dependent on the 
IFOV. The finer the IFOV is, the higher the spatial resolution.  
• The spectral resolution of an imaging system is the width within the 
electromagnetic spectrum that can be sensed by a band in a sensor. The 
narrower the spectral bandwidth is, the higher the spectral resolution [41].  
III.C. Dedicated Nuclear Facilities and Site Signatures 
Many of the capabilities of commercial satellite imagery can be applied to the 
monitoring of various international treaties. The quality of modern satellite imagery 
allows investigating even small details of facilities on the ground. This chapter describes 
the features and signatures of facilities related to the nuclear fuel cycle that can be used 
for early detection and determination of the real purpose and capabilities of those 
facilities. 
One of the important ways for international communities to monitor for nuclear 
proliferation is to identify the undeclared nuclear facilities and sites. Modern observation 
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satellites have an ability to cover the whole globe with regular and frequent visits and 
produce fine resolution images. Different imagery technologies can provide different 
types of information about the object: panchromatic sensors allow an analyst to use 
photo-interpretative techniques to recognize structures and objects by their shape, 
texture, shadows, orientation and context. Unlike panchromatic, multispectral and 
hyperspectral systems have lower spatial resolution, but they permit identification of 
materials or compositions of the surface by their spectral signature or color. Thermal 
satellite imagery has resolution even lower than multispectral imagery, but it carries 
useful information about the temperature distribution through the object and is very 
useful in some applications such as facility operational status determination. The last 
technology to be mentioned is RADAR§-imagery. The main advantage of this technology 
is its active nature and ability to penetrate through objects (e.g. clouds, ground, etc.) [42]. 
Nuclear fuel cycle facilities have a number of distinct features and signatures that 
can be extracted from satellite imagery of different types. The combination of imagery 
technologies provides the best opportunities for target detection and characterization. 
Although satellite imagery is a powerful tool, it should be understood that it cannot be 
expected to be a standalone verification method and information from other sources is 
often needed to help in detecting a facility, defining facility type, and determining its 
characteristics. Also, information from other sources can aid in recreation of the history 
and true intentions of the facility. 
                                                 
§ RADAR is an acronym for Radio Detection and Ranging. 
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Table III contains a summary of available distinct features and signatures for 
different nuclear or nuclear related facilities. Usually the type of facility can be 
determined by the presence of a combination of those signatures [43].  
 
TABLE III  
Nuclear Infrastructure Features and Signatures of Dedicated Facilities – Parts of Nuclear 
Fuel Cycle that are Observable from High-Resolution Commercial Satellite Imagery 
 
Nuclear Facility Type 
or Operations 
Observable Signatures and Features Limitations 
Uranium Mining 
Operations 
Piles of ore and tailings; 
large ore trucks; 
uranium mill 
Hard to distinguish 
from other mining 
activities 
In Situ Leaching of 
Uranium 
Pattern of injection wells and production wells, 
evaporation ponds 
 
Uranium Conversion 
Facilities 
Presence of canisters onsite Similar to many 
chemical plants 
Gaseous Diffusion Plants Large-area (roof) process buildings; roof 
ventilations shafts, cooling towers or nearby 
rivers or lakes, nearby fossil fuel power plants, 
large electric switchyards (substations); waste 
management and disposal facilities; security 
perimeters, railroads, roads, usually an isolated 
site. 
 
Gas Centrifuge Plants Switch yard, security fence, large containers of 
depleted UF6 
Lower electric and 
water cooling 
requirements 
comparing to other 
processes 
EMIS Facilities Small facilities with incoming high-voltage 
lines, local transformer stations 
 
Reactors Reactor containment buildings, security 
perimeters, cooling towers or natural water 
bodies (with intake and discharge port), high 
narrow stack (or its shadow), railroads, roads, an 
isolate site, absence of coal or large oil storage 
tanks 
 
Reprocessing Plants Very high stacks (or its shadows), long “canyon-
like” buildings, security perimeters, railroads 
and roads, large-scale water treatment, heavy 
lifting equipment, electrical power source, an 
isolated site 
 
Heavy Water Production 
Plant 
Cascade of exchange column, very high stack, 
large number of water storage tanks. 
Similar to other 
chemical process 
plants 
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III.C.1. Uranium from Mining Operations 
Mining operations to extract uranium ore can be conducted be open-pit or by 
underground mining. Moreover, these operations may be exclusively for the extraction of 
uranium or they may be in conjunction with copper and gold mining. Signatures related 
to these operations that would be visible to a satellite include the presence of piles of ore 
and tailings, large ore trucks and the uranium mill, except in the unlikely case of 
underground mill. In the case of uranium extraction in conjunction with other mining 
operations, the copper and gold mines themselves become visible indicators of possible 
uranium mining. The principal difficulty in this case would not be in seeing the mining 
operation but, rather, in being able to conclude that the mining was for uranium. 
However this information can be useful in conjunction with other sources of data. Also 
satellite imagery can be a cost-effective mean for determining the operational status of 
uranium mines. 
 III.C.2. Uranium by in Situ Leaching 
This form of uranium extraction does not involve the digging of ore and usually 
consists of a number of well fields and a central processing plant. The process involves 
the injection of a leaching agent into the ore zone through injection wells and the 
recovery of the resultant uranium solution through a production well. 
High-resolution satellite imagery would be able to detect two important features 
of this means of uranium extraction. First, there is a common pattern of wells consisting 
of a grid with four injection wells at the corners and a production well in the center; 
spacing generally ranges from 15 m to 30 m between the injection wells and the 
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production well. Secondly, evaporation ponds to dispose of wastes are a distinctive 
feature of the in-situ leaching process. These two features would allow distinctive 
identification of the in-situ leaching process. 
III.C.3. Other Uranium and Thorium Extraction Methods 
Among other extraction of uranium and thorium methods uranium from 
phosphate, uranium from seawater, thorium from monazite and thorium from uranium 
ore can also be mentioned. Most of these methods do not have distinguishing signatures 
on high-resolution satellite imagery; however, the operational status of the known 
facilities can be determined and continuously monitored. 
III.C.4. Uranium Conversion 
The presence on site of canisters used for nuclear materials could be a strong 
indicator of a uranium conversion facility. The primary obstacle to conversion plant 
identification is the similarity between conversion plants and many chemical plants. 
Identification would be enhanced if it is known that a conversion facility is collocated 
with a known facility, such as enrichment plant. 
III.C.5. Gas Centrifuge Enrichment 
A common feature of facilities engaged in uranium enrichment using UF6 feed 
materials is the depleted uranium produced by the processes. Often the large containers 
of depleted UF6 are stored in the open on large concrete rafts and would be visible from 
satellite imagery. 
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 Facilities used in this process would have a few signatures distinguishable by 
satellite imagery. Although the operation of the plant requires electrical power and water 
cooling, these requirements are low comparing to some other enrichment processes. 
III.C.6. Gaseous Diffusion Enrichment and Aerodynamic Enrichment 
Two enrichment processes with characteristics of interest from a satellite imagery 
perspective. The high-power demand of both would likely result in a need for the 
construction of a power plant in the vicinity. In any event, there will be a number of 
high-voltage supply lines coming into the facility and a large size switch-yard at the 
plant. Both processes require cooling water that results in a need for a large number of 
cooling towers and/or cooling ponds. The heat generated in the operation of these plants 
could also be detectable by infrared satellite imagery. Another common feature of these 
two enrichment methods is the need for large buildings to accommodate the many stages 
used in the process.  
III.C.7. Enrichment of UCl4 
UCl4 is a feed material for Electromagnetic Isotope Separation (EMIS) 
enrichment, Chemical Exchange enrichment and Ion Exchange enrichment. Of the three 
processes, EMIS offers the best possibility for the use of satellite imagery. EMIS 
facilities can be housed in a comparatively small building with a few signatures for 
detection by satellite imagery. However, an electric power demand of several tens of 
megawatts is required for even small facilities. High-voltage upcoming power lines with 
local transformer stations should be observable.  
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Plant structure for the Ion Exchange enrichment process would be modular. 
Buildings would be less than 10 m high, built to withstand explosions rather than 
earthquakes. The plants for both Chemical Exchange and Ion Exchange enrichment 
would have the appearance of a plant in the chemical industry. 
III.C.8. Fuel Fabrication 
There are no observables that would indicate the value of satellite imagery to the 
purpose of identification of undeclared fuel fabrication activities. Moreover, significant 
indicators would be unlikely even during construction of these facilities. 
III.C.9. Reactors 
There are several signatures related to satellite imagery identified for reactors, 
including containment buildings, and the presence of high-voltage power lines and 
cooling towers. The absence of coal and large oil storage tanks are also important 
indicators for identifying nuclear power plants. This category of nuclear activity is the 
most easily distinguishable from satellite imagery. 
III.C.10. Reprocessing 
A commercial scale reprocessing site has several signatures that would help in the 
identification process using satellite imagery. These include road and rail access for 
bringing in the spent fuel; high-capacity water supply; large-scale water treatment; 
cooling towers; heavy lifting equipment; electrical power source; and a building with a 
heavy duty overhead crane. The presence of transport canisters at the location is also a 
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possibility. These canisters may be from about 2 m to over 6 m long and weigh from 
50-100 tons. 
III.C.11. Heavy Water Production 
The ability to identify heavy water production plants from satellite imagery is 
dependent upon the type of technology used. For the most common technologies, water-
hydrogen sulphide exchange process and the ammonium-hydrogen exchange process, 
there are indicators, such as tall exchange towers, to assist in the detection. The co-
location of fertilizer plants in the case of the ammonium-hydrogen exchange process is a 
significant indicator. The similarity between heavy water production plants and chemical 
plants adds to the difficulty of identification. 
III.C.12. Research Centers 
Nuclear research centers in most cases can be identified by the presence of a 
research reactor using its containment building dome as evidence. Tall “smoke” stacks 
for the dispersal of off-gases are also common indicators. 
III.C.13. Monitoring Reactor Operational Status Using Thermal/Infrared and Radar 
Imagery 
The most significant indicator of the operational status of nuclear facilities such 
as a reactor or and enrichment plant is the heat loss. Heat is mostly discharged into large 
water bodies such as rivers of lakes or even seas or via cooling towers or naturally from 
buildings into the environment. Multispectral imagery with the thermal/infrared band 
enables the detection of such discharged water or heat distribution throughout the 
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building. The use of the thermal band gives some indication on the operational 
characteristics of, for example, a reactor. If the reactor, for instance, is shut down 
frequently, it might indicate that plutonium is being produced. This would then trigger 
further investigations. Such information would also be useful to confirm the operational 
status of declared closed down or decommissioned facilities. 
Certain regions of the Earth suffer from prolonged periods of cloud cover or 
darkness. Under these circumstances, a radar sensor is very useful because of its ability 
to penetrate clouds and to observe sites even in darkness. There are three important 
applications for radar imagery: 
1. detection of excess heat discharged through cooling water or cooling 
towers; 
2. use of its ability to detect heights; 
3. possible detection of underground activities. 
Another possible application is a detection of vehicles and their movement near a 
facility, particularly those that may occur at night or under cloud cover. Some may use 
the cover of darkness to move, for example, nuclear fuel by trucks or railway in order to 
avoid detection by optical satellites. Such movement could be detected using radar 
interferometry. 
Often in analyzing an optical image, it becomes difficult to know what a 
particular signature represents. It may be due to a building or just a disturbance of the 
soil. This could be resolved by the second application of radar. With a radar signal, it is 
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possible to measure height very accurately and it is possible to construct a contour map 
of the site that would assist in determining the nature of the observed signature. 
Moreover, power lines are not always easy to detect in an optical image unless 
there is a good contrast. On the other hand, with radar, pylons carrying power cables and 
railway lines can be readily observed. 
III.C.14. Google Earth 
Google Inc. is the world’s leading company in providing web-search services. 
The company was created in 1998 and has been rapidly growing ever since. In 2004, 
Google announced the acquisition of Keyhole Corp., a digital and satellite image 
mapping company. The acquisition gave Google users a powerful new search tool to 
view images from satellites across the Earth.  The new project was called Google Earth. 
A small desktop client that connects to the huge online database of satellite images 
covering the whole globe has been created. Main features of the program are:  
• the program is free for personal use, 
• sophisticated streaming technologies allow data delivery at the moment 
when it’s needed, 
• several terabytes of satellite and aerial data cover all of the Earth, 
• high-resolution data are available for multiple cities and places around the 
world, 
• easy-to-use search engines allow fast finding of places of interest. 
Google Earth can provide a great tool for browsing the Earth and exploring 
places of interest. To satisfy the goals of this study, the availability of high-resolution 
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imagery data for nuclear fuel cycle facilities all over the world has been investigated. 
Detailed images of the nuclear installations of Russia, USA, Japan, China, Iran, North 
Korea, India, and Pakistan were found and marked. Most of the images are dated from 
2005-2006. In Fig. 6 an image of Pakistan’s Khushab facility is presented. It is a very 
clear, high-resolution picture and most of the details of the heavy-water plutonium 
production reactor, heavy-water production plant and a new reactor construction site can 
be easily distinguished.  
 
 
Fig. 6. Khushab Plutonium Production Complex, Pakistan. 
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Another example is shown in Fig. 7, where Lake Karachai at Mayak PA in Russia 
is presented. This is one of the most contaminated places on the planet. The lake contains 
millions of Curies of fission products that were dumped as waste during the early years 
of the Soviet nuclear weapons program. Now there is an ongoing activity aimed at the 
elimination of the lake by filling it with dirt and concrete. Results of those activities can 
be clearly seen on this image. 
 
 
Fig. 7. Lake Karachai, Mayak PA, Russian Federation. 
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There are several advantages in Google Earth for INMAC. Availability of the 
current and detailed imagery proves Google Earth to be a valuable source and search 
engine for finding nuclear installations and undeclared facilities all over the world and 
performing visual inspection and initial characterization of those facilities. The “Google 
Earth Community” is a group of users from all over the world, who browse through the 
database and mark various places that they find interesting or they have information 
about. Those locations, sometimes with comments and additional information, are shared 
among the members of the community. Findings of the members of this community can 
be a valuable source of information related to undeclared nuclear-related activities. 
III.D. Satellite Imagery Analysis 
Imagery analysis is the last and the most important step in identification of 
dedicated nuclear facilities. There are several techniques that are used for analysis of 
different types of imagery. Usually one type of satellite imagery and analysis routine 
specific to this type of imagery are used. But in order to obtain the best results possible a 
combination of images and analysis techniques should be used. 
For the purpose of this study, investigation of imagery analysis capabilities was 
performed in the form of a case study. For the case study a 0.6-meter resolution 
panchromatic and 2.4-meter resolution multispectral images of the Rokkasho area in 
Japan were chosen. The attractiveness of this region is in the co-location of an 
operational uranium enrichment plant, low-level radioactive waste disposal site, and a 
construction site for reprocessing and MOX fuel fabrication facilities. Images were 
acquired on June 25, 2002 by the QuickBird sensor owned by DigitalGlobe, Inc.  
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The ENVI® Software package by Research Systems Inc. was used as the main 
tool for imagery analysis, classification, and annotation. ENVI® (the Environment for 
Visualizing Images) is an image processing system designed for analysis of satellite and 
aircraft remote sensing data. The software package provides basic and advanced tools for 
processing and analyzing panchromatic, multispectral, hyperspectral and radar remote 
sensing data. Software capabilities include data transforms, filtering, classification, 
registration and geometric corrections, spectral analysis tools, and radar tools [44].  
III.D.1. Panchromatic Imagery Analysis and Annotation 
When analyzing remote sensing data, the first task is to identify places or regions 
of interest. One way of doing that is browsing large areas looking for specific signatures 
or suspicious objects. This method is not very efficient and time/resource consuming. 
Some specific search system should be defined in order to optimize search process. One 
of the ways of searching for nuclear installations suggested in this study is utilizing the 
feature most common to the majority of nuclear fuel cycle related facilities – high 
electric power consumption. The idea is that tracking electric high-voltage power lines 
can help finding facilities with high-power consumption and lead to further investigation 
of the functions of those facilities by comparing them to a library of signatures specific 
to various facilities of interest.  
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Fig. 8. Tracking the Electric System of the Rokkasho Site. 
 
Analysis results of the electric power distribution system of the Rokkasho site are 
presented in Fig. 8. By tracing the electric poles, two major power lines were defined. 
The green line is supplying power to the Rokkasho village, which cannot be seen in this 
figure. The yellow line is specifically supplying the uranium enrichment plant and 
reprocessing and MOX fuel production plants. One of the power sources of the Aomori 
prefecture where Rokkasho is located, a wind power station, was also discovered on the 
image.  
Analysis of this image was performed by step-by-step visual identification of 
each individual electric pole and marking it. Automation of the process of mapping 
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high-voltage power lines can make searching less time consuming and allow creation of 
a “power distribution” profile for a country or a region of interest with minimal human 
operator involvement. Review of the created profile can lead to the discovery of 
unknown and suspicious facilities. 
 
 
Fig. 9. Uranium Enrichment Plant at Rokkasho, Japan. 
 
After the facility is localized, the next step is to explore its characteristics and 
annotate them. In Fig. 9, an annotated image of the Uranium Enrichment Plant at 
Rokkasho is presented. High spatial resolution allows extraction of various features of 
the plant. Process buildings with large roof areas, double security perimeter (fence), 
incoming high-voltage electric lines, switch yard and other signatures typical to 
centrifuge enrichment plants can be easily seen on this image. Several other 
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characteristic features were discovered: main entrance gate, administrative buildings, 
loading docks, air ventilation systems, etc. 
More detailed information about the facility can be extracted from the high-
resolution satellite image. For example, modern imagery analysis software allows 
performing measurements of dimensions of objects on the image. The measurement 
results of the dimensions for the main centrifuge halls of the Rokkasho Uranium 
Enrichment plant performed with the help of the ENVI software are presented in Fig. 10.  
 
 
Fig. 10. Measurement of the Dimensions of the Main Centrifuge Halls of the Rokkasho 
Enrichment Plant. 
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Using these data and information found in open literature it became possible to 
calculate some characteristics of this plant. For a typical centrifuge enrichment facility, 
enrichment capability is about 20 kg SWU per m2 of the facility [45]. Knowing that, 
enrichment capabilities of each building and of the whole plant were calculated. This 
estimated a capacity of 1,037 ton SWU. Results were compared to the official 
information on the Rokkasho Enrichment plant and appeared to be within 1.2% of the 
actual capacity of the enrichment plant which is listed as 1,050 ton SWU of separative 
power [46].  
A typical modern centrifuge uranium enrichment plant produces about 4 SWU 
per centrifuge and utilizes about 200 kWh per SWU. Using these characteristics and 
plant capacity calculated earlier, the electric power consumption of the plant was 
estimated at 23.7 MW, and the approximate number of centrifuges in this facility was 
estimated to be 260,000. The measured data are summarized in Table IV. 
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TABLE IV  
Calculation of Separative Power and Electric Power Consumption of the Rokkasho 
Enrichment Plant 
 
Building 
N X (m) Y (m) Area (m2) 
kg 
SWU/ 
m2 kg SWU 
SWU/ 
centri-
fuge 
N of centri-
fuges 
kWh/S
WU W 
                    
1 32.0 126.5 4048 20 80960 4 20240 200 1.85E+06
2 33.4 126.5 4225 20 84502 4 21126 200 1.93E+06
3 33.4 126.5 4225 20 84502 4 21126 200 1.93E+06
4 52.9 126.5 6692 20 133837 4 33459 200 3.06E+06
5 120.0 50.0 6000 20 120000 4 30000 200 2.74E+06
6 98.5 45.7 4501 20 90029 4 22507 200 2.06E+06
7 38.3 32.6 1249 20 24972 4 6243 200 5.70E+05
8 21.2 32.6 691 20 13822 4 3456 200 3.16E+05
9 68.0 97.0 6596 20 131920 4 32980 200 3.01E+06
10 60.1 113.5 6821 20 136427 4 34107 200 3.11E+06
11 60.1 113.5 6821 20 136427 4 34107 200 3.11E+06
        
Total:   51,869  1,037,398  259,349  2.37E+07
 
III.D.2. Multispectral Imagery Analysis 
Visual analysis of panchromatic imagery can provide a great amount of useful 
information, but it has certain limitations defined by image spatial resolution and image 
quality. The purpose of multispectral imagery analysis, performed during this study, was 
to enhance the results obtained from panchromatic imagery interpretation and to 
investigate the potential for automation of imagery classification and the use of spectral 
signatures for tracing various materials and compounds. 
III.D.2.A. Pansharpening 
Usually multispectral imagery has lower spatial resolution than panchromatic 
imagery; therefore, it has less spatial information. Recently, the technique of 
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pansharpening was developed. Pansharpening is a pixel level fusion technique used to 
increase the spatial resolution of the multispectral image using a panchromatic image of 
the same area. These techniques allow increasing the resolution while simultaneously 
preserving the spectral information in the multispectral data. The resulting picture has the 
resolution of a panchromatic image and retains most of the spectral information from the 
original multispectral image [47]. 
An example of a multispectral image before and after pansharpening is presented 
in Fig. 11. On the left-hand side, most of the features of the regular 2.4-meter 
multispectral image are not visually recognizable. On the right-hand side the sharpened 
image, an observer can make a conclusion about the presence of a high stack and 
surrounding infrastructure. 
 
 
Fig. 11. Example of a Multispectral Image Before and After Pansharpening. 
 
A multispectral image with higher spatial resolution may provide feature 
enhancement, increased classification accuracy, and help in the detection of various 
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materials or changes on site. There is a set of sharpening algorithms available in ENVI 
Imagery Analysis software. Among them are: HSV (hue, saturation, value) transform, 
color normalized (Brovey), Gram-Schmidt spectral sharpening, PC (principal 
component) Spectral Sharpening, and CN (color normalized) Spectral Sharpening. For 
each of the sharpening routines a number of resampling techniques (Nearest Neighbor, 
Bilinear and Cubic Convolution) is available [44].  
III.D.2.B. Multispectral Imagery Classification 
Multispectral sensor technology performs subdivision of spectral ranges of 
radiation into bands (intervals of continuous wavelengths), allowing sensors in several 
bands to form multispectral images. For any given material, the amount of solar radiation 
that reflects, absorbs, or transmits varies with the wavelength. This important property of 
matter makes it possible to identify different substances or classes and separate them by 
their spectral signatures (spectral curves), as shown in Fig. 12. 
 
Fig. 12. Percent Reflectance of Light for Different Materials [41]. 
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For example, at some wavelengths, sand reflects more energy than green 
vegetation but at other wavelengths it absorbs more (reflects less) than does the 
vegetation. In principle, it is possible to recognize various kinds of surface materials and 
distinguish them from each other by these differences in reflectance.  
This principle was used to map various classes of materials on a multispectral 
image of the Rokkasho site. In the ENVI Imagery analysis software there are several 
different algorithms available to perform spectral signature extraction and classification 
using those signatures. Routines are separated in 2 groups: unsupervised and supervised. 
For unsupervised classification, features are separated solely on their spectral properties 
without any input from the operator. Supervised classification algorithms use some prior 
or acquired knowledge of the classes in a scene. The operator is setting up training sites 
or regions of interest (ROI) to estimate and identify the spectral characteristics of each 
class. Multispectral imagery classification algorithms available in ENVI are listed in 
Table V. 
 
TABLE V  
Multispectral Imagery Classification Algorithms Available in ENVI Software 
Package 
 
Unsupervised Supervised 
IsoData Parallelepiped 
K-Means Minimum distance 
 Mahalanobis Distance 
 Maximum Likelyhood 
 Spectral Angle Mapper 
 Binary Encoding 
 Neural Net 
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Different combinations of sharpening and classification algorithms can produce 
results of different quality for imagery from different sensors. Moreover performance of 
the same sensor may vary for different areas on Earth. For each sensor type, there is a set 
of sharpening and classification routines that are capable of producing the best possible 
results. There are 112 possible combinations of available sharpening and classification 
algorithms in ENVI. An investigation of all available combinations of routines was 
conducted.  
In order to organize and structure output data, the naming convention presented 
in Table VI was created. Some of the parameters required two letters in the file name 
because of several additional options within them.  
A few initial tests were conducted to compare the performance of unsupervised 
and supervised classification algorithms. The quality of the results produced by 
unsupervised routines was not suitable for the purpose of this project. A decision was 
made to use supervised algorithms only. 
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TABLE VI  
Imagery Classification Output File Naming Convention 
 
Letter Parameter Values 
1st Scene F – Full Scene 
E – Enrichment Plant 
R – Reprocessing Plant 
M – MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility 
L – LLW Lanfill 
2nd Sharpening Algorithm H – HSV 
G – Gramm-Schmidt 
P – PC Spectral 
C – CN Spectral 
3rd&4th Resampling Technique NO – Nearest Neighbor 
BO – Bilinear 
CO – Cubic Convolution 
NA – Nearest Neighbor + Average 
NS – Nearest Neighbor + Sensor 
BA – Bilinear + Average 
BS – Bilinear + Sensor 
CA – Cubic Convolution + Average 
CS – Cubic Convolution + Sensor 
5th Classification Method P – Parallelepiped 
M – Minimum Distance 
D – Mahalanobis Distance 
L – Maximum Likelihood 
S – Spectral Angle Mapper 
B – Binary Encoding 
N – Neural Net 
6th Reserved for Parameter 
Variation in Classification 
Methods 
O – Default Parameters 
7th&8th  Reserved 00 – Default 
 
In order to define a combination that can provide the best possible classification 
results a two-step benchmark study was planned. The first step included analysis of a full 
scene multispectral image using all possible combinations of the sharpening and 
classification routines. This step was intended to outline a set of sharpening and 
classification algorithms combinations that provide the best results for QuickBird 
multispectral imagery. During the second step, the chosen set of algorithms was used for 
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thorough analysis of smaller parts of the image that included only one of the nuclear 
facilities. 
 III.D.2.C. Full Scene Image Classification 
For the full scene image classification, eight basic classes of materials were 
selected and colored Regions of Interest (ROI) were specified. The color codes and 
associated color names used in ENVI are listed in the  
Table VII. Several types of materials were chosen for classification of the full 
scene image. The fist type was for substances most common in the image, such as 
healthy vegetation and open water. The second type was for materials widespread on 
facility sites and construction areas: pavement, dirt and several kinds of roof material and 
metal constructions. One of the intentions was to also prove that this technique can be 
used for automatically allocating various features such as electric power line system. 
 
TABLE VII  
Classes and Color Codes, Defined for Full Scene Image Classification Analysis 
 
Class Description ENVI Color 
Name 
One Letter 
Code 
Color Reference 
Metal Constructions Red M  
Healthy Vegetation Green 3 V  
Open Water Blue W  
Pavement Green P  
Dirt Yellow D  
“Grey” Roof Material Cyan G  
Storage Tank Roof Material Magenta T  
Lab Building Roof Material Purple L  
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The full scope of pansharpening and image classification analysis was performed 
after classification classes were selected and defined. As a result of this analysis, 336 
files (112 images) occupying about 100 Gb of memory space were created. After visual 
analysis of all images, the 10 most suitable combinations of sharpening and classification 
techniques were selected. It appeared that not all of the combinations performed 
uniformly with different classes. Several correlations between sharpening and 
classification algorithms performance with different classes were discovered. It is 
recommended that a set of different routines combined with classes which they perform 
best should be used. Resulting combinations of algorithms and groups of classes that are 
capable of producing suitable results are presented in Table VIII. The last column of the 
table shows sets of classes of materials for which selected algorithms work best. 
Only the Gramm-Schmidt sharpening algorithm performed well enough for the 
Quickbird sensor imagery to produce images suitable for classification. Other techniques 
did not provide satisfactory results and were not used in future analyses. 
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TABLE VIII  
Combinations of Sharpening and Classification Techniques and Associated Classes 
Suitable for Full Scene Image Analysis 
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All selected combinations performed well with vegetation and water. This 
observation can be explained by the fact that spectral signatures of those classes are 
easily distinguishable from others, and also that these two classes are the most abundant 
in the image. Another observation was that none of those combinations were suitable for 
all defined classes at the same time. The most number of classes that each of these 
combinations of routines was fitting well was five. Also, it appeared that there were no 
good results produced for pavement classes. The explanation for this effect is in the 
selected ROI that was not fully representative of all pavement areas on the image. 
Examples of images resulting from sharpening and classification are presented in 
Figs. 13 and 14. Figure 13 is an image created using the Gramm-Schmidt sharpening 
with Cubic Convolution plus Average of Low Resolution Multispectral File resampling 
technique and Spectral Angle Mapper classification.  
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Fig. 13. Full Scene: Gramm-Schmidt Sharpening, Spectral Angle Mapper Classification. 
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Fig. 14. Visual Localization of Electric Poles in the Forest: Unclassified Image (Left) vs. 
Classified (Right). 
 
In Fig. 14, fragments of unclassified and classified images showing two electric 
poles, located in the forest, are presented. Poles cannot be easily distinguished visually 
on the unclassified image. The classified image shows them clearly marked as metal 
constructions. All classified images that were selected as suitable for future analysis can 
be found in Appendix A. 
III.D.2.D. Reprocessing Plant Image Classification 
The first step of multispectral imagery analysis revealed a number of sharpening 
and classification routines suitable for Quickbird sensor imagery analysis. The second 
step was intended to expand the level of detail of analysis by applying chosen algorithms 
to a smaller area of the scene. A part of the image containing the Rokkasho Reprocessing 
Plant construction site was chosen. Using ENVI’s “shape file” capability which allows 
extraction of the same geo-referenced areas from the images with different spatial 
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resolution, new multispectral and panchromatic images were created. New images were 
then used as feed data for sharpening routines of the ENVI software.  
Because this part of the study was intended to provide more details about the 
composition of the area, new materials were selected for classification of reprocessing 
plant construction site. Two grades (dark and light) of dirt and vegetation were selected. 
Then a set of specific construction materials was selected: “grey” and “blue” roof 
materials, metal constructions, pavement, “yellow” piping connecting buildings, water 
cooling units and “blue” isolating material for underground structures. All defined 
classes and associated color codes are presented in Table IX.  
 
TABLE IX 
Defined Classes and Color Codes for Reprocessing Plant Construction Site Analysis 
 
Class Description ENVI 
Color 
Name 
Two Letter 
Code 
Color Reference 
Dark Dirt Red DD  
Light Dirt Maroon LD  
Dark Vegetation Green 3 DV  
Light Vegetation Green LV  
“Golden” Piping Yellow GP  
“Grey” Roof Material Cyan GR  
“White” Roof Material Magenta WR  
Blue Roof Material Blue3 BR  
Metal Constructions Blue MC  
Pavement Sienna PV  
Cooling Water Sub-facility Purple3 CW  
“Blue” Underground Structures Thistle1 US  
 
All sharpening and classification routines selected during the full scene imagery 
analysis and a few additional routines were applied to the reprocessing plant construction 
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site image. During the analyses, 36 images were created, 3 images appeared to be 
suitable for analysis. Appropriate algorithms are summarized in Table X. One of the 
main improvements comparing to the full scene analyses was in the fact that the selected 
three sets of algorithms provided suitable results for all classes of materials at the same 
time.  
 
TABLE X  
Combinations of Sharpening and Classification Techniques and Associated Classes Most 
Suitable for Reprocessing Plant Construction Site Image Analysis 
 
 
 
 
In Fig. 15, a full classified image of the reprocessing plant construction site is 
shown. As can be seen in the image, most of the areas of interest were detected and 
mapped appropriately by the analysis routines. Similar to the full-scene analyses, 
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mapping algorithms provided the best performance on the materials that are the most 
abundant in the image, such as vegetation, dirt, and paving. Most of the roof and piping 
connecting buildings materials were also detected correctly. Metal constructions, such as 
electric poles allowed defining the electricity supply lines. In case of cooling water sub-
facilities:  facility, where the initial ROI was chosen, was mapped completely with the 
right color. The second water cooling facility was not completely identified, although 
parts of it were mapped with the right color which can provide an idea to an operator 
about the purpose of the whole facility. 
 
 
Fig. 15. Classified Image of the Reprocessing Plant Construction Site. 
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Fig. 16. Comparison of Multispectral and Classified Images of the Reprocessing Plant 
Construction Site. 
 
In Fig. 16 fragments of sharpened and classified images are presented. This figure 
provides more detailed information about the performance of the sharpening and 
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mapping routines.  Some of the prominent findings are highlighted on the images and 
described below: 
1. Numbers 1 and 4 are two small buildings outside the main facility 
fence that were not easily noticeable on the regular multispectral 
image. Buildings were detected and marked as “grey” roof material on 
the classified image. This is an important example of locating “hidden” 
or camouflaged buildings that could possibly be missed during the 
visual inspection of the area image. In case of unknown facility this 
ability will allow to find covert buildings, for example, antiaircraft 
guns protecting covert facility from air strikes. 
2. Numbers 2, 6 and 8 are electric powerline poles in the forest. These 
poles were successfully detected and marked. This example 
demonstrates an ability to trace electric powergrid of the area and 
identifying facilities that are high electric power consumers. 
3. Number 3 shows successful detection and mapping of dirt patches in 
the forest. This demonstrates an ability of classification algorithms to 
distinguish between several similar classes of material and properly 
map them. 
4. Similar to number 3, number 5 demonstrates classification algorithm 
capabilities. 
5. Number 7 shows successful mapping of paving and asphalt. During the 
full scene analysis paving was often detected as dirt or as one of the 
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roof materials. The problem was in the similarity of spectral signatures 
of the ROIs chosen for those materials. After some tuning and 
choosing a different ROI for paving it was effectively separated and 
mapped. 
6. Number 9 shows facility entrance gate. 
7. Number 10 - “blue” building roofs.  
 
        
Fig. 17. Example of Erroneous Detection and Mapping of Several Areas on the Image. 
 
Together with multiple successes in classification of important areas of interest, 
there were also some examples of mistaken or incorrect detection of some areas and 
materials. For example in Fig. 17 an erroneous detection of several metal constructions 
(electric pole) in the forest area is shown. Those small areas in the forest appeared to be 
darker and their spectral signatures are close to the signature of metal constructions. 
Several more misinterpretations can be found in this figure such as dirt areas mapped as 
81 
vegetation and a small square building in upper part of the image mapped as paving. 
Among the main reasons for those misinterpretations are: 
• lack of spectral information (low spectral resolution): multispectral images have 
only 4 bands. Often spectral signatures for several materials are very, an image 
with higher spectral resolution is needed to resolve those materials. 
• image nonuniformity: spectral characteristics of the same materials may vary 
throughout an image, because of variation in their composition, amount of 
reflected light, presence of mixtures of several materials, etc. 
III.E. Satellite Imagery Analysis Conclusions 
In this chapter it was proven that panchromatic and multispectral imagery 
analyses are two powerful and valuable tools for monitoring of illegal nuclear 
proliferation activities. Panchromatic imagery available on the market provides superior 
spatial resolution of up to 0.6 meters per pixel. It can be used for visual investigation of 
the areas of interest and for the quest for signatures specific to nuclear fuel cycle 
facilities. Multispectral imagery on the other hand has lower spatial resolution compared 
to panchromatic imagery. With the help of the new sharpening techniques it is possible 
to create good quality high-resolution multispectral images with the resolution of 
panchromatic image and preserving the level of detail of spectral information. Several 
classification routines are available for detailed material mapping and analysis of 
sharpened images. During this study two images were analyzed: Rokkasho site full scene 
and Rokkasho reprocessing plant construction site. The ENVI imagery analyzing 
software package was used for all analyses. In both cases several sets of sharpening and 
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classification techniques that provided the best results for the Quickbird sensor 
multispectral imagery were defined. Use of these routines allowed successful 
classification and mapping of various materials present in those scenes. It was proven 
that multispectral imagery analysis together with high-resolution true-color imagery 
analysis can be a very valuable tool for tasks like locating “hidden” or camouflaged 
buildings or troops, automatic mapping of scene’s power gridlines, defining sources and 
recipients of electric power, and other tasks involving classification of various materials 
and determination of functions of facilities of interest. Overall performance of analysis 
routines was satisfactory. Most of the materials and areas under investigation were 
properly detected and mapped by the software. Also some mixed and erroneous results 
were produced for several types of materials. Most of those misinterpretations can be 
explained by the lack of spectral resolution in multispectral imagery. Several of those 
discrepancies were successfully corrected by “fine tuning” (better choice of ROI’s 
specific to materials, use of different algorithms, and variation of parameter of analysis 
routines). 
Proof of applicability of satellite imagery analysis for tracking nuclear 
nonproliferation regime violations suggests it as one of the main search and investigation 
tools for INMAC. Satellite imagery can aid in a wide variety of tasks starting with 
locating suspicious facilities and all the way to determining detailed characteristics of 
particular facilities and sites. When this imagery analyses is extensively utilized by 
INMAC, a database of best sets routines and associated parameters for different types of 
imagery, various sensors, terrains, etc. is proposed. This type of database would help to 
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avoid time consuming preliminary analysis and would allow quick and high quality 
results. Time is very important parameter in detection of covert nuclear weapons 
program and revealing it to the world. Also development of automated software that is 
capable of recognizing imagery types and applying appropriate analysis routines is 
proposed. Special thresholds can be set up for presence of specific materials and some 
other criteria based on which the software will warn an operator about the presence of 
suspicious objects. Human operator analysis can be used on the areas specified by the 
software in order to create final conclusions. 
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CHAPTER IV 
BLIND TEST CASE SATELLITE IMAGERY ANALYSIS 
IV.A. Problem Statement 
As a part of this research project investigation of satellite image of an unknown 
nuclear facility was performed. The goal of this task was to determine the type of the 
nuclear facility using visual signatures specific to nuclear installations without any prior 
knowledge about the facility. Unknown case was provided by professor Charlton as a 
bundles multispectral (4 bands, 2.4-meter resolution) and panchromatic (1 band, 0.6-
meter resolution) acquired by the QuickBird sensor. Imagery analysis should result in 
description of a set of features of the facility on the image, which are also specific to 
various nuclear fuel cycle facilities. Based on these signatures, the type(s) of the 
facility(ies) on the image should be determined. Obtained results will be compared with 
the existing known information about installations.  
IV.B. Preliminary Analysis Steps 
For effective visual analysis a natural color high-resolution image is desired. The 
first step in analysis of an unknown nuclear facility image was pan-sharpening of an 
existing low-resolution multispectral image. Based on the experience obtained during the 
known imagery analysis described in Chapter III, a Gramm-Schmidt sharpening routine 
was chosen together with the Nearest Neighbor resampling technique. As a result a 
multispectral image with the resolution of 0.6 meters was created and saved. High 
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resolution multispectral was than converted into a natural color composite image. All 
visual analyses were performed on the natural color image.  
IV.B.1. Full Site Description 
The site on the image is a group of co-located facilities. During the initial 
inspection of the site security fence lines were annotated. The result was a set of eight 
separately fences areas and a large fence surrounding the full site (light green line). The 
full scene image with annotated fenced areas is presented in Fig. 18. 
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Fig. 18. Full Scene Visual Analysis Results. 
 
Visual analysis of the site revealed the presence of several suspected nuclear fuel 
cycle facilities on this site, including nuclear reactors, nuclear fuel reprocessing plant, 
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waste treatment and disposal facility, etc. Three main hypotheses were formulated: (1) 
this site is concentration of purely civilian nuclear fuel cycle facilities, (2) this is a 
military site and its main purpose is weapons grade nuclear material, and (3) this is a 
dual-purpose facility that is intended for weapons material production, but it is also a part 
of the civilian nuclear fuel cycle of the country. Discovery of the two outgoing electric 
power lines eliminated pure military site designation option. Detailed analyses of the 
individual facilities were performed next. 
IV.B.2. Nuclear Reactor Buildings 
Three operating nuclear reactor confinement buildings were found on the image 
during visual analysis. Also another possible reactor facility with the rectangular reactor 
containment building was discovered. Visual analysis of all suspected reactor facilities 
allowed determining the primary designation for each facility and some of its 
characteristics.  
The largest reactor facility (area 2 in Fig. 18) consists of the two reactor domes 
and a series of support buildings. Two outgoing electric power lines originating from the 
building next to confinement structures suggest that this facility is a nuclear power plant. 
Results of the detailed analysis of this facility are presented in Fig. 19. 
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Fig. 19. Suspected Nuclear Power Plant. 
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The main signatures characterizing this nuclear power plant include two reactor 
confinement buildings (44.5 meters in diameter each), suspected turbine hall with 
containing turbines is located in the tall rectangular building to the east of the domes. 
There are no cooling towers around the facility. A water intake and discharge port 
connected to the complex shows that ocean water is used for cooling purposes. Among 
other characteristic signatures of the nuclear reactor is a high stack, outgoing electric 
power lines, and security fence. 
Another reactor facility (Fig. 20) appears to be a research reactor, but could also 
be a plutonium production facility. It is located on the north side of the “campus” (area 6 
in Fig. 18). The diameter of the confinement building is 27.8 meter, which is smaller 
than the power plant reactor domes. Smaller confinement building suggests that this 
facility is dedicated to research purposes and contains a lower-power reactor core. 
There is a series of laboratory buildings around the confinement building, which 
looks like a small reprocessing plant, or a set of chemical laboratories. This reactor may 
be used for military purpose of plutonium production or possibly for various medical and 
industrial isotope production, including separating of fission products from the spent 
fuel. Another prominent feature of this facility is the presence of the cooling tower, 
which suggests the presence of the secondary water coolant loop. Similar to the majority 
of other facilities onsite, the suspected research reactor has an individual security fence 
line. 
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Fig. 20. Suspected Research Center / Plutonium Production Reactor. 
 
The third suspected reactor site (area 1 in Fig. 18) is located north-east from the 
power plant. There are several signatures that suggest that this is potentially a reactor 
site. The tall rectangular buildings appear to be the confinement. There are also several 
cooling towers, water discharge port and a high stack for off-gas dispersal. There are no 
switch yard or out going power lines, which means that if this is really a reactor facility, 
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it is dedicated to production of plutonium. The image of the suspected plutonium 
production reactor is presented in Fig. 21. 
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Fig. 21. Suspected Plutonium Production Reactor. 
 
IV.B.3. Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Plant 
Several facilities in this site appear to have several signatures specific to nuclear 
fuel reprocessing plant. Among the signatures: large interconnected long “canyon-like” 
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buildings, a very high stack for process off-gas release, storage tanks, and security fence 
line around it. The image of the largest of the suspected nuclear fuel reprocessing plants 
is presented in Fig. 22.  
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Fig. 22. Suspected Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Plant. 
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The reprocessing plant may be dedicated to recycling of the spent nuclear fuel 
from the power plant reactors and is producing a mixture of plutonium and uranium for 
the mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel. Presence of several reprocessing facilities may indicate 
that weapons-grade plutonium production is also taking place in this site. 
IV.B.4. Waste Treatment and Storage 
Another prominent facility is a nuclear and radioactive waste treatment and 
disposal plant. This installment is co-located with the reprocessing plant. The main 
features of the facility include a set of buildings that appear to be for waste processing 
and segregation; several burial sites; several sediment ponds; a few wells, possibly for 
deep underground injection of high level radioactive waste from the reprocessing plants.  
There are two types of waste burial present onsite: above ground storage in 
containers and underground disposal, where waste containers are covered with dirt after 
disposal. Different types of disposal were developed for various types of waste, 
depending on its activity and physical form.  
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Fig. 23. Suspected Nuclear Waste Treatment and Disposal Facility. 
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IV.C. Conclusions 
Visual analyses of the blind case scenario image revealed the presence of several 
co-located nuclear fuel cycle facilities. It appears that the site performs activities 
covering almost the full nuclear fuel cycle. The full list of suspected facilities includes: 
• nuclear power plant with two reactor units,  
• research reactor,  
• possibly a plutonium production reactor,  
• nuclear fuel reprocessing plant, 
• nuclear and radioactive waste treatment and disposal facility, 
• research laboratory buildings, 
• new reactor unit construction site, 
• possible mining site. 
No uranium enrichment facility was identified on the image. Based on that, there 
are several options for the nuclear fuel cycle of the country: (1) enrichment activities are 
taking place in a different location and (2) reactors onsite are utilizing natural uranium 
fuel. 
Based on the visual analysis of the full site and individual facilities, a conclusion 
can be made that this is a dual-purpose civilian and military site. At least two reactors are 
used for electric power production for the surrounding area. Spent fuel from these 
reactors is possible being reprocessed for reuse of leftover uranium and produced 
plutonium in the MOX fuel or purely for plutonium extraction for military purposes. 
95 
Two other reactor facilities are used for research purposes and for plutonium production. 
There are no indications of these facilities producing electricity.   
The results of the blind case study were compared to the known information 
about facilities on the image. The ground truth for the image was provided by Professor 
Charlton. The facility on the image appeared to be Kalpakkam Nuclear Establishment in 
India. This site includes Madras Atomic Power Station (MAPS) and Indira Gandhi 
Centre for Atomic Research (IGCAR).  
Majority of the conclusions from the blind case image analysis were confirmed 
by the facts known about the facility. For example, suspected nuclear power plant 
(Fig. 19) appeared to be MAPS. It is one of the India’s nuclear power plants which 
currently consists of two heavy-water, natural uranium reactors, with the power levels of 
155 and 202 MWe. Suspected research reactor (Fig. 20) is Kamini 233U fueled research 
reactor (0.03 MWt). Another facility that was identified as suspected plutonium 
production reactor appeared to be Fast-Breeder Test Reactor. This reactor is fueled by 
natural uranium and plutonium and has 40 WM thermal power. Presence of a 
reprocessing plant (Fig. 22) and waste treatment and disposal facility (Fig. 23) was also 
confirmed during comparison of the study results against the ground truth. The fact that 
majority of blind case investigation conclusions were confirmed serves as another proof 
of the applicability of defined visual signatures for identification of nuclear fuel cycle 
facilities. 
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CHAPTER V 
USE OF PUBLICLY AVAILABLE SOURCES OF INFORMATION  
V.A. Background 
Besides commercial satellite imagery and computer codes for imagery analysis 
there is a variety of other publicly available sources of information that can be utilized 
for tracking violations of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Among those sources are: 
press reports, unclassified government reports, police reports and other institutions 
reports, watchdog groups testimonies, etc. This chapter describes the Libyan uranium 
enrichment centrifuge technology procurement as a case study showing the level of detail 
of information that can be compiled from various open sources. 
V.B. Libyan Uranium Enrichment Centrifuge Technology Procurement Program 
V.B.1. Brief History of Libyan Nuclear Weapons Program 
On December 19, 2003 Libyan officials announced that Libya was abandoning its 
clandestine nuclear weapon program. The country’s major facilities included a 10-
megawatt light-water research reactor and a critical assembly (100 watts), both located at 
the Tajura Nuclear Research Center (TNRC). A number of previously undisclosed 
nuclear sites were disclosed, and international officials were allowed to inspect them. 
Almost three decades of clandestine activities preceded this disclosure. 
The Libyan nuclear weapons program was started in 1970s. Among the main 
motives for the Libyan government to try to acquire nuclear weapon capabilities were: a 
97 
response to the Israel’s clandestine but widely-suspected nuclear weapon development 
and a desire to become a bigger player in Middle Eastern and African politics. In the 
beginning of the 1970s, the Libyan government allegedly attempted to purchase an 
assembled nuclear weapon directly from China. After those attempts were rebuffed 
Libya turned to Pakistan in 1977, offering financial aid and supplies of uranium from 
Niger and hoping to share the results of Pakistan’s nuclear program. It is important to 
note that meanwhile, in 1975, Libya ratified the NPT (it had been signed in 1969 by King 
Idris, who was later deposed in a military coup) and received a Soviet 10-megawatt 
research reactor, which began operating at Tajura in 1979. During the following year, 
Libya negotiated a formal safeguards agreement with the IAEA and placed its declared 
nuclear facilities under international safeguards. In the late 1980s, the Soviet Union 
pledged to build a 440 MW power reactor in the Surt region, but those plans never 
materialized. 
Libya voted for indefinite extension of the NPT at the 1995 NPT Review and 
Extension Conference and in 1996 signed the Treaty of Pelindaba together with 42 other 
African countries, establishing the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone (NWFZ). In 
1997, the Russian Federation restarted nuclear cooperation dialog with Libya, and, in 
March 1998, the Russian Atomenergoeksport Company signed a contract involving the 
partial overhaul of the Tajura research reactor. The possibility of cooperation in 
construction of a nuclear power station was reportedly under discussion in 1999.  
Libya’s known facilities before the December 2003 announcement included the 
TNRC, which was constructed with the assistance of the former Soviet Union, beginning 
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in the late 1970s. The TNRC is thought to be at the heart of Libya’s nuclear activities and 
has been the focus of foreign technical assistance in the past. In 1984, international 
journalists were allowed to visit the TNRC and reported having seen various types of 
‘state-of-the-art’ nuclear related equipment and instrumentation from Hungary, Poland, 
the former Soviet Union, Switzerland and the US.  
The TNRC consists of numerous laboratories and facilities. One such facility is 
the 10-megawatt (MW), pool-type Tajura Research Reactor (IRT-R), which was 
constructed in 1980 and went critical in 1981, but probably did not become operational 
until 1983. The reactor’s core was previously filled with HEU that was originally 
transferred from the Soviet Union, but has since been removed and replaced with low 
enriched uranium (LEU) under the U.S. Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return (RRRFR) 
Program. The TNRC also houses a critical facility that operates a 100-watt critical 
assembly and a TM4-A Tokamak fusion reactor. In addition the TNRC houses a nuclear 
metallurgy laboratory and a radiochemical laboratory with a number of hot cells that 
have been used to produce various isotopes, such as 131I for medical and agricultural 
purposes. 
The TNRC also houses a physics research centre with various facilities for 
conducting research on nuclear physics, solid-state physics, neutron physics, materials 
science and engineering, radiation biophysics and mass spectrometry. Some of these 
facilities contain hot cells and glove boxes that, theoretically, could have been used to 
carry out spent fuel analysis, isotope production and other isotope-related research 
activities [12]. 
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This concludes the brief description of what was known to the world until Libyan 
government revelations in 2003 and beginning of IAEA inspections of previously 
undeclared nuclear facilities. Libya’s undeclared nuclear program involved frequent 
movement of key equipment and nuclear material, and it relied heavily on support from 
foreign sources.  
V.B.2. Uranium Enrichment Centrifuge Technology 
In its pursuit to obtain a nuclear weapon, Libya chose a highly enriched uranium 
weapon route (Fig. 1). There are various methods to enrich uranium, one of which is 
through gas centrifuges. This chapter provides a description of key technologies, 
materials and elements necessary in order to obtain centrifuge uranium enrichment 
capabilities. 
Isotope separation is a difficult and energy intensive activity. Enriching uranium 
is difficult because the two isotopes are very similar in mass: 235U is only 1.26% lighter 
than 238U. Several production techniques applied to enrichment have been used, and 
several are under investigation. In general these methods exploit the slight differences in 
atomic weights of the various isotopes. Among the uranium enrichment methods 
developed during the nuclear era are: thermal diffusion, gaseous diffusion, gas (zippe) 
centrifuge, aerodynamic, electromagnetic, laser, chemical, and plasma separation. Only a 
few of these methods were developed to industrial scale. Gas centrifuge is currently one 
of the most popular and energy-efficient methods in use. A highly efficient centrifuge 
plant can produce 25 kilograms of weapons-grade enriched uranium using 
500,000 kilowatt-hours of electricity.  
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Centrifuges use uranium hexafluoride (UF6) as a feed material. It is a solid white 
material at a room temperature. At higher temperatures, UF6 evaporates into a very 
corrosive gas, and can be used for uranium enrichment. A centrifuge for uranium 
separation consists of a smooth cylinder that rotates on its axis at high speeds. UF6 gas is 
injected into the rotating cylinder from a fixed tube introduced into the center of the 
centrifuge from above. The gas volume follows the cylinder, rotating at the same speed: 
the rotating outer wall gives its speed to the gas hitting it, and this gas, in turn, gives its 
speed to the gas near it until all the gas is rotating as if it were a single unit. Enriched gas 
and depleted gas are taken out by scoops at, respectively, the top and bottom of the 
centrifuge cylinder. The gas is made to circulate with a flow of gas down the periphery 
and back up nearer the axis. The lighter gas is not taken off on the axis of the centrifuge, 
because the gas density there is too low. It is, instead, taken off by a scoop at a smaller 
radial distance from the axis than the depleted gas, which is taken off near the 
periphery [48]. 
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Fig. 24. Zippe-Type Centrifuge Diagram [49]. 
 
Fig. 24 shows a diagram illustrating the basic principle behind a Zippe-type gas 
centrifuge for enrichment of uranium. Here the heavy isotope of uranium (238U) is 
represented in dark blue, while the lighter isotope of uranium (235U) is represented in 
light blue. The input gas (here represented as a fairly even mix of 235U and 238U, though 
in reality natural uranium hexafluoride would have less than 1% of 235U in it) is released 
into the center of the centrifuge and the centrifugal forces force the heavier gas to 
concentrate at the edges of the centrifuge and the lighter gas at the center. By heating the 
bottom of the centrifuge the lighter gas will be moved by convection currents to 
concentrate at the top while the heavier gas will concentrate at the bottom (scoops, not 
shown, would then extract the gases). Here the effect is greatly exaggerated for 
conceptual simplicity; in reality it would be very subtle and it takes thousands of 
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centrifuges linked together to enrich any substantial amount of uranium to any 
substantial amount of enrichment [49]. 
The centrifuge cylinders would have to be made with great accuracy, and be of 
very strong material. Assembly would require special techniques, such as electron-beam 
welding. Because of the corrosive nature of UF6, all components that come in direct 
contact with UF6 must be fabricated from, or lined with, corrosion-resistant 
materials [50]. 
The primary limitation of the rotor wall speed is the strength-to-weight ratio the 
rotor material. Suitable rotor materials include alloys of aluminum or titanium, maraging 
steel, or composites reinforced by certain glass, aramid, or carbon fibers. At present, 
maraging steel is the most popular rotor material for proliferators. With maraging steel, 
the maximum rotor wall speed is approximately 500 m/s. Fiber-reinforced composite 
rotors may achieve even higher speeds (advanced design carbon fiber rotors can exceed 
600 m/sec). Another limitation on rotor speed is the lifetime of the bearings at either end 
of the rotor. Rotor length is limited by the vibrations a rotor experiences as it spins. The 
rotors can undergo vibrations similar to those of a guitar string, with characteristic 
frequencies of vibration. Balancing of rotors to minimize their vibrations is especially 
critical to avoid early failure of the bearing and suspension systems. Because perfect 
balancing is not possible, the suspension system must be capable of damping some 
amount of vibration. One of the key components of a gas centrifuge enrichment plant is 
the power supply (frequency converter) for the gas centrifuge machines. The power 
supply must accept alternating current (ac) input at the 50- or 60-Hz line frequency 
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available from the electric power grid and provide an ac output at a much higher 
frequency (typically 600 Hz or more). The high-frequency output from the frequency 
changer is fed to the high-speed gas centrifuge drive motors (the speed of an AC motor is 
proportional to the frequency of the supplied current). The centrifuge power supplies 
must operate at high efficiency, provide low harmonic distortion, and provide precise 
control of the output frequency [45]. 
Also very important from the safety standpoint is centrifuge casing. A single 
centrifuge casing can enclose one or numerous rotors (depending on the centrifuge 
design), and is needed in maintaining a vacuum to facilitate the flawless operation of 
these rotors. The casing’s secondary role is to contain exceedingly fast spinning 
components is case of a centrifuge malfunction. If not contained, shrapnel from one 
centrifuge breakdown can destroy adjacent centrifuges and in essence start a harmful 
chain reaction within a cascade [51]. 
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Fig. 25. Schematic of a Typical Uranium Enrichment Gaseous Centrifuge [52].  
 
A schematic representation of the typical uranium enrichment centrifuge is 
presented in Fig. 25. Pakistan’s nuclear program developed the P1 and P2 centrifuges – 
the first two centrifuges that Pakistan deployed in large numbers. The P1 centrifuge uses 
an aluminum rotor, and the P2 centrifuge uses a maraging steel rotor. These centrifuges 
are made of approximately 100 components that can be broken down into the following 
categories: 
1. very high precision rotors of material of very high tensile strength 
2. ring magnets 
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3. non-corrosive pipes and valves 
4. end-cap 
5. baffle 
6. specially crafted bearings 
7. damping systems 
8. containers 
9. motors 
10. pumps 
11. flow valves 
12. flow-meters 
13. high-vacuum pumps 
14. power supply (frequency changer). 
Because the enrichment output of a single gas centrifuge is insufficient to obtain 
significant uranium enrichment, several hundred or even thousands of gas centrifuges are 
linked together in what is known as cascade. A cascade is the basic building block of a 
gas centrifuge enrichment facility. This allows UF6 gas to pass through a successive 
number of centrifuges in various cascades and gradually this process leads to increased 
enrichment of the 235U to the desired enrichment level. 
V.B.3. Libya’s Enrichment Technologies Procurement Timeline 
Libya started developing its uranium enrichment program in the 1980s. At least 
two facilities were built to conduct centrifuge research and development: the original 
testing facility at Al Hashan; and the newer research facility at Al Khalla. Later the 
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project Machine Shop 1001 was constructed to assemble centrifuges. During the 1980s, 
Libya’s scientists worked with a ‘European expert with relevant experience’ (possibly 
Karl Heinz Schaab) to design a gas centrifuge. The expert brought a centrifuge design 
with him to Libya, and worked with the Libyans to develop two types of centrifuges. 
Libya was interested in both ‘L-1 and L-2 type’ centrifuges (presumably the same as 
Pakistani P-1 and P-2 centrifuges). Although they were not successful in building a 
working centrifuge system, Libya did gain experience in designing and operating 
centrifuge equipment and related technologies [53].  
In 1997 Libya had contacted Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan to obtain help and expertise 
in the field of uranium-enrichment centrifuge technology. Khan Research Laboratories 
(KRL) – the main entity in Pakistan that was in charge of national nuclear program 
development. The program was started in 1970s. Dr. Khan was the key figure in the 
development of Pakistan’s nuclear program. In his quest for nuclear technologies he 
created a worldwide network of nuclear technology suppliers. Dr. Khan used his contacts 
and resources of his laboratory for his personal profit. 
During the period of 1997-2002, a series of meetings between Khan and 
representatives of Libya – Mohamad Matuq Mohamad and Karim took place in Istanbul 
(Turkey), Casablanca (Morocco) and Dubai. The results of these meetings were a $100 
million contract for the supply of centrifuge components and an “off the shelf” gas 
centrifuge manufacturing plant. Allegedly Khan also provided Libya with design of the 
nuclear warhead, free of charge as a “deal sweetener”. Supposedly most of that data were 
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for a 10-kiloton warhead with a mass of 500 kilograms that would not have fit on Libya’s 
SCUD missiles, but could have been delivered through other means.  
In 1997 Libya purchased ten assembled P-1 centrifuges from Khan Research 
Laboratory (KRL). These centrifuges were previously decommissioned from Pakistan’s 
nuclear program. Shortly after that Libya purchased components for about a 100 
additional P-1 centrifuges. Furthermore, Libya attempted to procure advanced P-2 
centrifuges. Two P-2 centrifuges and components for a few more were sent to Libya in 
September 2002 as demonstration models. Libya placed an order for 10,000 more P-2 
centrifuges shortly after receiving demonstration units. Since each centrifuge consists of 
more than a 100 components, the order required approximately one million components. 
Libya’s final goal was to create a 10,000 centrifuge cascade for producing HEU that 
could be used in nuclear warheads. After starting the cascade Libya would have the 
capability of producing enough material for 10 nuclear weapons annually.  
Simultaneously with the attempts to purchase centrifuges Libya was working on 
building its own gas centrifuge production capabilities. This project had a codename 
“Machine Shop 1001”. The main objective of the project was to manufacture 
components in Libya and build additional centrifuges after the initial shipments of 10000 
centrifuges had been delivered. The initial plan included detailed plant design 
information, electrical and electronic equipment, 20 tons of UF6, and feed and 
withdrawal equipment for uranium. Most of the equipment for “Machine Shop 1001” 
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including furnaces, machine tools, and other equipment came from different European 
countries, particularly from or through Italy and Spain. The majority of this equipment 
was sent to Libya through Dubai. Acquisition of equipment for “Machine Shop 1001” 
involved other alleged Khan nuclear black market associates, including British citizen 
Peter Griffin, former owner of Gulf Technical Industries (GTI) in Dubai, and German 
citizen Gotthard Lerch, former employee of Leybold Heraeus, a German vacuum 
technology manufacturer [51]. Information about countries, companies and individuals 
involved in providing help to Libya in its quest for nuclear weapon capability is 
summarized in Table XI. 
 
TABLE XI  
Summary of Key Players of AQ Khan’s Nuclear Black Market Involved in Libya’s Gas 
Centrifuge Technology Procurement 
 
Country Company Person Parts Comments 
China   Uranium Conversion Facility  
SMB 
Computers BSA Tahir  
Several equipment transfers to Libya were 
conducted through SMB Computers. 
Dubai 
Gulf Technical 
Industries 
(GTI) 
Peter Griffin  
GTI is a company in Dubai, which 
belonged to Peter Griffin and was used for 
reexporting of several items to Libya. 
France Cazeneuve  CNC Lathe Mexica 590 Machine for Scope purchased from France 
Leybold 
Vacuum GmbH 
Gotthard Lerch 
 
pipes for the Machine Shop 
1001 
have tried to obtain supplies of pipes for 
the Machine Shop 1001 Project by 
sourcing from South Africa but failed to 
obtain it even though payment had been 
made by Libya earlier 
 Karl Heinz Schaab  gas centrifuge specialist, involved with Iraq 
 Heinz Mebus, an engineer   
Germany 
Ship BBC 
China owned 
by German 
company 
  
on 4 Oct 2003 was examined in the port of 
Taranto, ITALY, where 5 containers were 
confiscated because they were believed to 
contain components related to the Libyan 
uranium enrichment program 
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TABLE XI (continued) 
Country Company Person Parts Comments 
 Peter Griffin Italian – made furnace, lathe machine 
Alleged to have supplied the lay-out plan 
for the Machine Shop 1001 as a workshop 
to enable Libya to produce centrifuge 
Great Britain 
  
CNC Lathe Hawk 
(Cincinnati), 
CNC Machining Center 
Arrow 500 (Cincinnati), 
Emco PC Turn 155 
Machines for Scope were bought from 
Great Britain 
Italy   Machine tools and furnaces  
Scomi 
Precision 
Engineering 
SDN BHD 
(SCOPE) 
 
Outer casing (P2), 
molecular pumps (P2), 
top spacers (P2), 
positioners (P2), 
top ends (P2), 
crash rings (P2), 
stationary tubes (P2), 
clamp holders (P2), 
flanges (P2) 
BSA Tahir allegedly commissioned 
SCOPE factory to manufacture centrifuge 
components for delivery to Libya. A total 
of 25,000 centrifuge components were 
manufactured for Libya. Malaysia 
 
BSA Tahir 
(Buhary Seyed 
Abu Tahir) 
 
BSA Tahir was AQ Khan’s right-hand 
man. Participated in meeting between AQ 
Khan and Libyans. 
Pakistan 
Khan Research 
Laboratory 
(KRL) 
A. Q. Khan 
1.7 tons of UF6, 
92 assembled P-1 
centrifuges, 
Parts for additional 128 P-1 
centrifuges, 
Two P-2 centrifuges, 
Additional parts for several 
P-2 centrifuges, 
Design for a nuclear 
warhead assembly. 
Head of international nuclear black market 
CETEC Friedrich Tinner  
CETEC was reported to have prepared 
certain centrifuge components, including 
safety valves, and he sourced many of the 
materials that were made in several 
companies in Europe. 
Vakuum-
Apparate-
Technik (VAT) 
Friedrich 
Tinner  
VAT was identified by the Swiss Defense 
department as involved in shipping 
possible nuclear related items to Iraq and 
Pakistan 
 
Urs Tinner (son 
of Friedrich 
Tinner) 
 
Helped to set up the SCOPE factory. He 
was actively involved in the manufacturing 
operations in the SCOPE factory. He 
controlled much of the centrifuge design 
for AQ Khan’s network. 
Switzerland 
Traco Company 
Marco Tinner 
(son of 
Friedrich 
Tinner) 
 
Traco was responsible for the export of 
flow forming equipment for Machine Shop 
1001. 
Traco was used for importing key cutting 
and grinding machinery to SCOPE 
Taiwan Monaset  Universal Tool Grinder Machine for Scope purchased from Taiwan 
ETI 
Elektroteknik Gunas Jireh 
Power supply components; 
ring magnets; aluminum 
casting and dynamo. 
ETI Elektroteknik is a Turkish electronics 
company. ETI’s director Gunas Jireh is a 
former employee of Siemens in Germany. Turkey Elektronik 
Kontrol Aletleri 
(EKA) 
Selim Alguadis 
electrical cabinets and 
power supplier-voltage 
regulator 
Selim Alguadis, the president of EKA, is a 
Turkish engineer who has reportedly been 
in contact with AQ Khan since 1980s. 
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V.B.4. Key Players of the Procurement Network 
Libya’s successful procurement of uranium enrichment centrifuge technology 
was possible due to the international procurement network headed by the “father of 
Pakistani atomic bomb” Abdul Qadeer Khan. Pakistan’s need to produce nuclear 
weapons became urgent after India tested its nuclear weapon on 18 May 1974. In view of 
this, the Kahuta Plant was set up and the Khan was forced to get equipment discreetly 
from developed nations, especially those in Europe. In the process, he developed contacts 
to get the needed material from several countries. This had to be done discreetly because 
Pakistan had to develop a nuclear weapon for national defense after India’s nuclear test 
received opposition from many Western countries. Amid these difficulties, Khan 
successfully developed a network of middlemen that involved several people and 
companies from Europe, the Middle East, and Asia seeking to make profits by selling 
certain materials and equipment. However, it was a loose network, without a rigid 
hierarchy, or a head and a deputy head as was alleged.  
Several key figures played the major part in this network. Detailed information 
about most of the key individuals involved in Khan’s network collected from various 
open sources is available. Only several network operatives are described in this chapter 
to demonstrate the level of detail that can be found and compiled.  
BSA Tahir whose full name is Buhary Seyed Abu Tahir (Fig. 26), is a citizen of 
Sri Lanka and a businessman based in Dubai.  BSA Tahir and his brother own a 
company named SMB Group, Dubai, where he is the Group Managing Director.  In 
1998, BSA Tahir married a Malaysian woman and gained permanent residency in 
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Malaysia.  SMB Group started as a family company in 1980 and is now involved in the 
computer and IT fields.  Generally, BSA Tahir spends time overseeing his businesses in 
Dubai and only returns to Malaysia, once in a while, to visit his wife’s family or look for 
business opportunities. Upon his father’s death in 1985, BSA Tahir took over the 
management of SMB and in the process visited Pakistan and succeeded in getting 
contracts to sell air conditioning equipment to KRL.  During this time, BSA Tahir 
became acquainted with Khan. At the same time, BSA Tahir got to know middlemen 
from other countries, including Europe, who were involved in supplying uranium 
centrifuge components on behalf of Khan [54]. 
 
 
Fig. 26. Buhary Seyed Abu (BSA) Tahir 
 
Urs Tinner whose full name is Urs Friedrich Tinner is the son of Friedrich 
Tinner, the president of CETEC company in Switzerland who allegedly had dealings 
with AQ Khan since 1980s. Urs Tinner had been a full-time technical consultant to 
SCOPE starting April 2002. As a consultant, Urs Tinner was responsible in importing 
and setting up the machine that was bought through the services of his father, Friedrich 
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Tinner. There were also machines imported through Traco Company, Switzerland, 
owned by Marco Tinner, the brother of Urs Tinner. Among the types of machines bought 
and fixed by Urs Tinner were:  
• CNC Lathe Hawk (Cincinnati), United Kingdom, 
• CNC Machining Center Arrow 500 (Cincinnati), United Kingdom,  
• CNC Lathe Mexica 590 (Cazeneuve) in France 
• Emco PC Turn 155, United Kingdom 
• Automated Bandshaw Cutting Machine (Averizing), Taiwan 
• Universal Tool Grinder (Monaset), Taiwan. 
Urs Tinner ended his term of service at the SCOPE factory in October 2003. Just 
before this, he had taken the hard drive of the company’s computer that was designated 
for his use. Urs Tinner also had taken his personal file from the SCOPE factory’s 
records. According to testimonies of several SCOPE staff, Urs Tinner erased all technical 
drawings that were kept in the computer at the SCOPE factory. This gave the impression 
that Urs Tinner did not wish to leave any trace of his presence there and wanted to ensure 
that the technical drawings did not fall into the hands of the SCOPE factory staff. 
However, Urs Tinner left behind a machine, i.e., a manual turning machine. It was a 
1948 model made in Schaublins, Switzerland. This machine was never used 
V.B.5. Sources of Information Used During Investigation 
All information described in this chapter was obtained solely from publicly 
available sources of information and unclassified government reports. Data were 
thoroughly collected and reviewed. Various pieces of information were put together to 
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create a comprehensive picture of the Khan’s network relations with Libya and some of 
the network operatives involved in materials and technology transfers to Libya.  
A large number of press reports and news releases were used, some of these 
reports contained interviews with the middlemen involved in activities supporting 
Libya’s weapons program. The majority of the information was compiled from news 
articles and radio interviews such as Time Magazine, Africa News, Johannesburg SAPA, 
Al-Sharq al-Awsat and many others. Press reports and news coverage archives from 
United States, South Africa, South Korea, Malaysia, Great Britain, and United Arab 
Emirates were used during this investigation. The full list of press sources is compiled in 
Table XII.  
TABLE XII  
Press Report and Articles Used for Libya Case Investigation. 
 
News Paper of Press Agency Reference Number 
Africa News [55] 
Agence France-Presse (AFP) [56], [57] 
Al-Sharq alAwsat [58] 
Arab News [59] 
BBC [60] 
Dawn [61], [62] 
Financial Times [63], [64] 
Johannesburg SAFM Radio [65] 
Johannesburg SAPA [66], [67] 
Johannesburg This Day [68] 
Korea Times [69] 
Los Angeles Times [70] 
NIS Export Control Observer [71] 
The Associated Press [72] 
The New York Times [73], [74], [75] 
Time Magazine [76] 
United Press International [77] 
Washington Post [78], [79] 
Washington Quarterly [80] 
Washington Times [81] 
Wolgan’gongjakkigye [82] 
Yonhap [83], [84] 
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A very important part of the investigation is the historical and technical country 
profile. This information helps in understanding the motives of the country starting its 
covert nuclear weapons program, its initial scientific and technical capabilities, and also 
amount of resources available. Based on this assessment, a level of foreign assistance 
that was needed can be estimated. In addition to historical data various technical papers 
and grey literature resources were used to obtain detailed information about centrifuge 
uranium enrichment technology and particularly about Pakistani designs of the P-1 and 
P-2 centrifuges.  
 Information from international customs services allowed tracing shipments of 
various centrifuge parts. Several countries and companies involved in production and 
then transfer of the centrifuge parts to Libya were revealed as a result of shipping 
paperwork analysis. Some of the companies were just intermediaries providing a 
shipping address to avoid direct shipments from the producer to Libya, and could 
possibly be involved in transactions with other suspected proliferators. Another 
important piece of information that allowed estimating the scale of the Libyan nuclear 
program, is the quantity of shipped materials and parts. As an example, one of the 
SCOPE’s packing lists for the shipment of aluminum tubing to one of the intermediary 
companies in Dubai is presented in Fig. 27. 
An important resource for this investigation is the report by Malaysian police, 
which was published on February 20, 2004 [54]. The report was compiled on the request 
of American and British intelligence services, as a part of investigation of activities of 
Sri Lankan businessman’s BSA Tahir, who ordered centrifuge components manufactured 
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by SCOPE. The report covers the timeline of production activities at SCOPE, the 
involvement of outside individuals involved in placing the order, and the identification of 
the supervision of the manufacturing process. Company’s management admitted making 
centrifuge components at the factory, but they stated that SCOPE was not aware of parts’ 
final destination and that they believed these parts were for the oil and gas industries. 
 
 
Fig. 27. SCOPE Packing List for Aluminum Tubing Shipment to the Intermediate 
Company in Dubai [54]. 
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V.C. Conclusions 
In this chapter a detailed full-scope overview of Libya’s procurement of uranium 
enrichment centrifuge program was provided. A historic outline of Libya’s declared 
nuclear program is combined with the timeline of the undeclared-at-the-time 
procurement of centrifuge technology and components. Key figures of Khan’s nuclear 
black market, and also of companies around the world, who were directly and indirectly 
involved in this covert program are also listed and described. 
Open-source investigation of Libya’s procurement of uranium enrichment 
centrifuge technology is one of the examples of successful analysis of a violation of 
nuclear nonproliferation regime. An impressive level of detailed information that was 
collected proves the feasibility of a community of academic research groups performing 
similar open-source investigations.  
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CHAPTER VI 
INTEGRATION OF INFORMATION FROM ALL AVAILABLE SOURCES 
VI.A. Introduction 
Open-source analysis is an essential component of nuclear nonproliferation 
verification. Recent advancements in world-wide communications and data access 
provide extensive capabilities for organizations and individuals around the world for data 
search, exchange and analysis. High-resolution commercial satellite imagery offers views 
of virtually any location on Earth with resolutions from less than one to five meters. An 
expanding wealth of open-source information is being published in both commercial and 
public databases, both in hard-copy or online. Interested parties may acquire the imagery 
and open-source information through direct purchase or indirectly through research 
services. Civil groups, like INMAC, may use this new range of resources either to 
support or to challenge verification and compliance procedures for several disarmament 
treaties including NPT. 
During open-source information analysis, the most effective results can be 
obtained from the integration of data from all available sources of information. This 
chapter covers a wide variety of topics: the proposed structure of the community of 
academics; educating members and means of interaction between and among them; 
several possible open-source investigation scenarios; information analysis techniques, 
and data integration mechanisms for collaborative open-source investigation by a 
community of academics. Suggested methods of compiling data from all available 
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sources of information would allow extraction of the most detailed information about the 
proliferator’s intentions, capabilities, and weapons program scale. 
VI.B. Proposed INMAC Structure 
For a large international community of academics, one of the key requirements 
for effective information search and analysis is the well-organized interaction and data 
exchange among its members. Operational structure of the organization would define the 
ways for collaboration between the academic community members.  
INMAC structure is proposed as a set of peers (research groups) around the 
world. These groups would be created by the subject matter experts or specific 
institutions. Besides performing pure search and analysis tasks, one of the goals of the 
community and individual teams is development of innovative methods of data search 
and analysis. To fulfill this goal, specialization in particular sources of information or 
analysis types for each individual group would be desired, but it should not be a hard 
requirement or a limiting factor. 
Research groups would be formed by the geographic location or by the area of 
interest/expertise. Example of the first option would be a situation, when a subject matter 
expert in a particular institution or geographic area creates a group of his/her students or 
co-workers. Members of the second type of a group would not be co-located 
geographically, but would be united by the interest in the same subject. Subject matter 
experts would educate members of their research groups and lead various projects carried 
out by the group.  
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Another kind of educational activities would be topical forums and workshops 
that could be organized for interested members of the community. During these 
workshops, analysts would meet with each other and find others with similar areas of 
interest, present results of their research, exchange experience, and develop new open-
source analysis methods and strategies. Knowledge and experience transfer will not only 
expand the number of experts and community workforce, but also guarantee knowledge 
retention and expansion. 
Created research groups would be able to exchange information and experience 
via the centralized server. It would provide storage for the collected information and data 
analysis. Most of the communication between members of the community would be 
carried out in the form of a blog or a forum. Blogs with different topics would be started 
by society members and would be accessible for review, comments, and adding of new 
information by all society members and groups. New data or analysis results would be 
added to the appropriate topic or topics if there are several related threads. Some of the 
groups would provide information verification and information integrity confirmation. 
VI.C. Examples of Possible Investigation Scenarios 
Historically most of the covert nuclear weapons programs became known to the 
world as a result of intelligence or criminal investigations of international nuclear black 
market activities (Libya) or through watchdog groups’ revelations (Iran). After discovery 
of an illegal weapons’ program, satellite imagery, press and police reports, and other 
available data, is used for recreating the full scope of illegal activities. For example, in 
the case of Iran, its nuclear weapons program was revealed by one of the internal exile 
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groups, which stepped out and provided information about some of the activities that 
were taking place inside the country. Then, independently from government intelligence 
agencies, several research groups and nonproliferation policy institutes discovered a 
number of suspicious facilities and construction sites (Natanz, Isfahan, etc.) using high-
resolution commercial satellite imagery. Furthermore, customs data and an investigation 
of Khan’s international nuclear black market network revealed even more details about 
the program. 
There are several potential routes for open-source information investigation and 
for building a chain of documents and data leading to comprehensive scope of a 
proliferator’s real intentions. None of those scenarios can be universal or optimal for 
investigation. Each particular case may be initiated by information from a specific source 
and should be treated individually from there. However, in order to set up a universal 
monitoring system there should be several sources selected for constant surveillance. Use 
of such a system will allow early discovery of any type of illegal activities and initiate a 
full-scale investigation involving all resources available to INMAC. Satellite imagery, 
watchdog groups reports and customs information are suggested as such “constant 
monitoring” resources.  
VI.C.1. Satellite Imagery Scenario 
The use of commercial satellite imagery would allow detection of suspicious 
facilities around the globe with the help of sets of signatures specific to various nuclear 
fuel cycle facilities. In case of global monitoring, high-resolution imagery has limited 
application because of several reasons. First, huge arrays of data that are needed to cover 
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all areas of interest, which in turn lead to a demand in enormous storage space and 
calculation power. Second, large financial resources that would be needed to maintain an 
up-to-date library of high-resolution imagery. Because of these disadvantages, a use of 
lower-resolution multispectral or hyperspectral data is proposed. These data can be 
updated on a regular basis at a smaller expense and can be used as a feed for change-
detection algorithms. Areas where some significant changes are found can be further 
investigated for the presence of construction sites or newly built facilities with the help 
of high-resolution imagery. If a new facility or construction site is found, it should be 
first investigated for the presence of nuclear fuel cycle facility signatures. After that, 
local and national press-reports related to the area of interest should be browsed for 
announcements or any articles related to the new facility construction. Watchdog reports 
can provide more details about the true intention of the facility under construction. The 
next should be uncovering all suspicious shipments to the country and to the area using 
customs information. 
VI.C.2. Watchdog Group Scenario 
In a case when the first information about illegal nuclear weapons related activity 
is reported by one of the internal watchdog groups, some level of details about the 
program or facilities is usually provided in the initial report. As the next step, all 
available sources should be used to confirm the credibility of watchdog revelations. An 
extensive study of a high-resolution satellite imagery of the area identifying signatures 
specific to nuclear-fuel-cycle facilities should be conducted. Announcements and articles 
related to the area’s industry development in the local and national press should be 
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checked. Also an extensive search for any suspicious shipments and transactions should 
be performed using customs information. 
VI.C.3. Customs Information Scenario  
In this case investigation starts after discovery of several suspicious shipments to 
a particular country or area. Information available includes preliminary information 
about the types of materials and machinery procured by the state. This information may 
only provide an idea about possible facility type (chosen route, see Fig. 1). Satellite 
imagery and watchdog revelations can be used for locating an actual facility or 
construction site and for final confirmation of real intentions of a potential proliferator. 
All described scenarios are similar to each other and ultimately engage all 
available resources in order to obtain as much information about suspected nuclear 
weapons program as possible. Effective monitoring for suspicious activities is one of the 
most important parts of successful nonproliferation regime verification. Monitoring 
activities will be the major part of academic community operations. Ideally, in a 
proliferation-free world, it would be the only activity carried out by all monitoring and 
intelligence organizations and interested watchdog communities. 
VI.D. Proposed Investigation Algorithm 
In the previous section several possible investigation scenarios and open sources 
of information suitable for constant monitoring of suspicious covert activities were 
defined. Based on described information, investigation algorithm should be selected for 
the effective collaboration and exchange among members of the academic community. 
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This section describes the main phases or steps of the open-source investigation by the 
community of academics. Defining and separating these steps would provide structure to 
the interactions between and among various research groups within the community, 
would help in preventing the performance of same task by different groups, and would 
also provide a mechanism for effective data quality verification. A graphic flowchart of 
the proposed algorithms is presented in Fig. 28. 
The first stage of the process is selection of the country of interest and creating a 
plan for information collection. Continuous monitoring of several open sources of 
information that were proposed in the previous section would be performed on the first 
phase of the investigation. The actual investigation would start when one of the 
surveillance groups detects suspicious activities in one of the countries around the world. 
At this point planning of future activities would be performed. Because of the peer 
(non-hierarchical) structure of the community, the investigation plan would primarily 
identify (1) goals, i.e. what needs to be found or proven, (2) potential sources that can be 
used in order to achieve these goals, and (3) the approximate timeline for the 
investigation. 
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Fig. 28. Proposed Investigation Algorithm Flowchart. 
 
At the second stage, an extensive information search would be started. All 
appropriate directly related sources would be used for identification of countries, 
companies, and individuals involved. Satellite imagery would be used to find and 
analyze capabilities of nuclear fuel cycle related facilities. The historical and political 
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country profile would be studied to identify the country’s geopolitical concerns, internal 
regime and international relations. Also at this stage all found information would be 
structured and converted into a pre-defined standard format and all paper documents 
would be converted into electronic form for structures filing and retrieval. 
Stage three is defined as data analysis. At this stage research groups within the 
community specializing in data analysis would be engaged. Segregation and sorting of 
useful data from text and picture documents would be performed. If applicable, satellite 
imagery of suspected covert nuclear facilities would be studied for specific signatures 
and characteristics. All information found in languages other than English would be 
translated. The ultimate goal of this phase is clustering and linking related data. At this 
point, if analysts would determine the lack of or poor quality of data, they may request 
more information collection in a specific area or from a specific source. 
The next phase is dedicated to the verification of collected information. Special 
data verification groups would apply statistical methods to reveal anomalies in collected 
and analyzed data, verify credibility of the sources used, and perform gap analysis to 
determine areas where more information collection is necessary.  
The last stage consists of data compilation and report publishing. The final report 
may be a group effort of all participants or it may, for example, be primarily created by 
the group that first discovered a suspected violation. Resulting publication would contain 
a set of conclusion about the country’s or countries of interest nuclear weapons program, 
current development stage, acquired technology, etc. The logic behind any conclusion 
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should be convincing and be supported by the facts from the identified and confirmed 
sources.  
A proposed algorithm defines a general framework for the process of information 
collection and analysis by an international community of academics. All stages of the 
investigation process are closely related to each other and activities within these may 
overlap. Also these stages of investigation usually would not be separated by any specific 
timeframes and the vast majority of activities would be taking place at the same time. 
The main goal of identification of specific stages and steps is organizing and structuring 
functions of various research groups within the community and interactions between and 
among them.  
VI.E. Information Collection, Analysis, and Storage 
The variety of sources that may potentially be used during the investigation by 
the community of academics and members with a wide variety of expertise suggests the 
necessity for the unified procedure for interaction and information exchange between and 
among different research groups within the community. The community will consist of 
groups specializing in different sources and analysis. All groups will exchange 
information as needed and also all data will be accumulated in a structured format within 
the central server. 
Defining an effective interaction mechanism between and among members of the 
academic community is one of the primary tasks and conditions for the successful 
implementation of monitoring activities by the community. According to the 
proposed-above structure of the organization it would consist of a number of research 
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groups formed at particular geographical locations and/or by the area of interest and 
expertise. The centralized data storage and information exchange server would be 
designed to connect all groups together and provide the means of communication 
between and among members.  
There are several main characteristics of the investigation conducted by the 
academic community: 
1. all information will be accumulated on the central server; 
2. individual investigations can be created in a form of a thread in the blog 
(forum) on the server by any member of the society; 
3. each investigation would consist of a number of blocks similar to the steps of 
the classic nuclear fuel cycle; 
4. the number of blocks and specific activities included in each block would be 
determined by the creator of a thread and later can be modified; 
5. each member or research group would be able to access various threads and 
add documents, data analysis results, etc., as appropriate in relation to a 
particular block of a thread; 
6. all information and data analysis results would be assessed for credibility and 
relevance to the subject of investigation, a data confidence index would be 
calculated to assess information quality within each block; 
7. figure of merit would provide estimated progress of the suspected country in 
creating a weapons-production nuclear fuel cycle, assessment would account 
for the credibility and consistency of the results and conclusions; 
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8. based on conclusions and results, a credibility assessment results report would 
be prepared to describe findings and suspected activities in a country that is 
the subject of the investigation. 
VI.E.1. Central Server Information Storage Structure 
The following structure is proposed for individual investigation threads on the 
central server. Once there is a suspicion about an illegal activity in a country, a research 
group or a member creates a new thread on the central server. The creating user defines 
specific blocks that describe the path and suspected activities in the country. In general 
these blocks would follow classic steps necessary for acquisition of nuclear weapons’ 
capabilities described in Chapter I (e.g. uranium milling, uranium conversion, acquisition 
of uranium enrichment centrifuge technology, etc.). An example of a possible 
investigation thread structure is presented in Fig. 29. If the actual path is not clear after 
the first detection of suspicious activities, additional blocks would be added during the 
investigation when more information is available. 
Community members accessing the central server would be able to look through 
the information in each section of the investigation, add new documents, analyze data 
collected by other members and groups and provide analysis results, and also discuss 
findings and results with other members of the community. Specific database format 
would be developed to accommodate effective storage and display of information from 
different sources and of different nature. 
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Fig. 29. Example of a Hypothetical Investigation Thread Structure. 
 
Among the advantages of the block/step structure for the open source 
investigation are: (1) it allows members to add information about a particular step or 
activity taking place in the country of interest, instead of attempting to combine 
information about the country’s nuclear program as a whole; (2) it also allows step-by-
step assessment of the proliferation route chosen by the country and the current stage of 
development of this route. 
VI.E.2. Open-Source Information Credibility and Relevance Assessment Methodology 
One of the primary concerns associated with the open-source information 
investigations is questionable reliability of data sources. It is important to keep track of 
the information confidence in order to estimate the reliability of the final results and 
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conclusions. The following procedure is proposed for the community of academics for 
open-source information credibility and relevance assessment. 
During the investigation all found sources and information obtained from these 
sources would be assigned with two coefficients: relevance ( nr ) and credibility ( nc ). The 
coefficients would range between 0 and 1. The first coefficient would describe the 
relevance of the information or data analysis results to the subject of the investigation. 
For example, images of specific facilities or shipping data should have relevance 
coefficient of equal or close to 1. Historical/political background, which is usually not 
directly related to the particular proliferation activity, should have a less than 1 relevance 
coefficient. The credibility coefficient provides a numerical description for the level of 
reliability for the sources used. For example, most of the historical data will have 
credibility equal or close to 1 and some of the local press reports or watchdog group 
revelations may have a less than 1 credibility coefficient. 
During the final data compilation and publishing the overall quality of the 
collected information should be assessed. This evaluation would help to estimate the 
credibility and reliability of the collection of information from open sources and data 
analysis results for each block of the compilation. Data confidence index for each stage i 
is given by 
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If the population of sources used in compilation of data for a block within the 
investigation is large enough, the confidence index will be representing the true 
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statistical mean. Often there would be sources in the population with one or both 
coefficients significantly lower than the rest of the population. Such outliers tend to 
significantly decrease the average. There are several approaches to defining these 
numbers and treating them. One of the methods is statistical analysis of the population 
and defining outliers as numbers that are outside of the three standard deviations range 
from the mean of the population.  
Several options should be taken in consideration. If the population of sources has 
a wide span of credibility and relevance coefficients, the standard deviation of such a 
population would more than likely be high. In this case the range of two or even one 
standard deviation should be used for defining outliers. If standard deviation of the 
population is low, than standard “3-σ rule” should be applied. The standard deviation is 
given by 
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Once statistical outliers are selected, operator’s judgment should be used to 
determine actions towards them. Usually sources not directly related to the subject or 
sources with extremely low credibility are most likely to become outliers. In most cases, 
due to their insignificance, these sources can be excluded from the population. Another 
case is when one of the sources is providing information contradicting some the findings 
of the investigation. In this case information should not just blindly be excluded from the 
population but additional searches should be performed to verify information from other 
sources and investigation conclusions. 
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TABLE XIII  
Example of Distribution of Credibility and Relevance Coefficients within Hypothetical 
Investigation Block 
 
Hypothetical Source n cn rn cn·rn Outlier 
(1σ) 
Watchdog 1 0.70 1.00 0.70  
Historic Info 2 1.00 0.20 0.20 Yes 
Historic Info 3 1.00 0.50 0.50  
Press Report 4 0.90 0.90 0.81  
Press Report 5 0.10 0.20 0.02 Yes 
Watchdog 6 0.95 1.00 0.95  
Scientific Article 7 0.99 1.00 0.99  
Scientific Article 8 1.00 0.80 0.80  
Watchdog 9 0.82 1.00 0.82  
Satellite Image 10 1.00 1.00 1.00  
Visual Imagery Analysis 11 0.94 1.00 0.94  
Multispectral Imagery Analysis 12 0.92 1.00 0.92  
Transit Company Info 13 0.01 1.00 0.01 Yes 
Transit Company Info 14 0.70 1.00 0.70  
Middleman Info 15 0.84 1.00 0.84  
Shipping Paperwork 16 0.57 1.00 0.57  
Shipping Paperwork 17 0.88 1.00 0.88  
Data Analysis Results 18 0.75 1.00 0.75  
Contradictory News Report 19 0.60 0.01 0.005 Yes 
Other 20 0.91 1.00 0.91  
 ui 0.6639  
 Std. Deviation 0.3390  
 
An example of a hypothetical population of open sources of information is 
presented in Table XIII. A variety of sources and data analysis results related to one of 
the blocks of an investigation were collected. Each of the sources was assigned 
credibility and relevance coefficients. Based on assigned values, the data confidence 
index (ui=0.6639) and standard deviation (σi=0.3390) were calculated. Because the 
standard deviation in this case was high, a “1-σ rule” was used for outlier analysis. Four 
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potential outliers were defined. After review of the data the following actions were 
proposed:  
a. Keep historical information documentation (n=2) in the 
population. Even though it has low relevance to the block i, it 
provides valuable historic background to the overall 
investigation; 
b. Remove press report (n=5) from the population since, it has 
very low credibility (0.10) and also low relevance to the block i. 
Removing this source will not impact results significantly, but it 
will increase the overall data credibility index; 
c. Remove the source (n=13) containing information about the 
company used for transit of materials or technology into the 
country. Credibility of this source is too low (0.01); 
d. Keep the news report (n=19) contradicting conclusions of the 
investigation and perform addition information search. Based 
on the new results, this report would be removed or 
investigation conclusions will be changed. 
After following the recommendations above, new confidence index value became 
0.74 and standard deviation is 0.27. If, after additional information search, it would be 
determined that contradictory news report can be removed from the population, the 
values would become 0.79 and 0.2 respectively. 
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VI.E.3. Figure of Merit 
During an open-source investigation, besides estimating data confidence index 
for each individual block, it is important to evaluate the results of the investigation as a 
whole. It is also important to have some numerical value describing the suspect country’s 
progress in acquiring a nuclear weapon. A single number (figure of merit – FOM) 
characterizing both the country’s progress and the quality of information used to analyze 
this progress is proposed for use by a community of academics. 
The following procedure is suggested for calculating the FOM. During the 
investigation, information collected in each individual block and conclusions made based 
on this information would be assessed and two indexes would be assigned to every 
block. The calculation procedure for the first, data confidence index (ui), was described 
in the previous section. The second, progress index (wi), would not have any calculation 
method and would be assigned by analysts based on the information collected. This 
index would describe estimated progress of a country in completing a particular stage of 
the nuclear fuel cycle. An example of a hypothetical investigation thread consisting of 
seven steps and the distribution of confidence and progress indexes is presented 
in Fig. 30.  
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Fig. 30. Distribution of Confidence and Progress Indexes in Investigation Thread. 
 
For any full investigation or a particular part of it FOM is given by 
1
1(1 )
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where ui- confidence index for a block i of the thread, 
wi -estimated progress index for a step i of the nuclear fuel cycle, 
I – total number of blocks in the investigation or the number of blocks 
being assessed. 
FOM is a number between 0 and 1 that provides a quality assessment of the 
results of investigation. The closer this number to 1 the higher probability of the country 
of interest completing its nuclear program or a part of it being assessed, with the 
confidence provided by information collected as a part of the investigation.   
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An example of an investigation thread with hypothetical confidence and progress 
indexes is presented in Fig. 31. In this example, according to investigators of individual 
blocks, the country had completed developing uranium ores (or obtained some raw 
material from another nation), had developed uranium conversion capabilities, and 
acquired necessary technologies for uranium enrichment. Also it has completed building 
about 75% of its own enrichment facility.  No weapons part or high-explosives 
development were started at the time of investigation. 
 
 
Fig. 31. Example of an Investigation Scenario with Hypothetical Confidence and 
Progress Indexes. 
 
Based on the data confidence and progress estimates for each individual block, a 
series of FOM’s for the entire program and progressive steps can be calculated. The 
results are summarized in the Table XIV. As expected from the chart, the overall nuclear 
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weapons program of the country has a very low FOM (0.08). The country under 
investigation has not completed its uranium enrichment facility and has not started any 
preparation for building an actual weapon. On the other hand, the country of interest 
made substantial progress in building its uranium enrichment program: 0.67 for the steps 
1 through 4.  
 
TABLE XIV  
FOM Calculation Results of the Hypothetical Case Investigation 
 
Stage FOM 
1 0.94 
2 0.89 
3 0.78 
4 0.67 
5 0.33 
6 0.17 
7 0.08 
Full 0.08 
 
Perhaps, more representative is a graph describing the hypothetical country’s 
achievements in creating a nuclear program (Fig. 32). A threshold can be established, 
and all steps above the threshold would be considered to have significant progress. 
Ideally the full curve should be located above the threshold for the program to become 
military significant. 
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Fig. 32. FOM for Different Stages of the Hypothetical Nuclear Weapons Program. 
 
VI.D. Conclusions 
Open-source analysis is a complex task that requires a large amount of time and 
resources. This type of analysis is becoming more recognized by various treaty 
verification organizations including the IAEA.  An international community of 
academics would be one of the means of providing necessary manpower and expertise to 
aid the IAEA in searching for undeclared nuclear activities around the world. Creating 
such a community would help to unite and organize a large number of researchers, 
professors, students and other representatives of academia from all over the world. But 
the more important task is to create an effective structure and to provide the mechanism 
for the members of the community to interact, communicate, collaborate, teach, learn, 
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exchange experience and so on. Only with such effective structure verification and 
monitoring can proliferation detection tasks be performed and successfully completed. 
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CHAPTER VII 
LIMITATIONS AND PROLIFERATOR’S POTENTIAL SPOOFING 
TECHNIQUES AND SCENARIOS 
VII.A. Introduction 
Use of various individual open sources of information and their combinations for 
tracking nuclear nonproliferation regime violations appears to be a powerful tool, but 
there are some limitations associated with these sources. Besides, potential proliferator, 
being aware of constant monitoring, may use some tricks to hide illegal activities or 
mislead investigators. This chapter explores potential weaknesses of all information 
sources described in previous chapters. Also several, so-called spoofing techniques, and 
tricks that may be used by a potential proliferator in order to avoid being caught, are 
investigated.  
VII.B. Commercial Satellite Imagery 
Several limitations for detection of undeclared facilities are imposed by the 
nature of satellite imagery itself. Limited spatial and spectral resolutions, high prices, the 
size of Earth, satellite return timeframe, etc. are the main contributors to overall 
restrictions imposed by use of satellite imagery. In addition there are several limitation 
associated with imagery analysis algorithms, such as limited precision of classification, 
time consuming ROI selection and performance tuning, etc. 
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Limited spatial resolution. During the recent decades spatial resolution of 
commercially available satellite imagery has improved dramatically and currently 
panchromatic imagery of up to 0.6 m resolution is available on the market. This level of 
detail may not always be sufficient for comprehensive analysis of covert facilities. At the 
same time as imagery resolution was improving new technologies were developed 
allowing using small-scale facilities that can produce enough material for one or two 
weapons a years rather than constructing a full-scale industrial size plant. It is more 
likely that a “smart” proliferator would follow this route. In case of an underground 
facility or even a reactor confinement building, more detailed imagery would help to 
analyze individual visible features (piping, wall thicknesses, etc.) in order to have better 
estimate of facility designation and scale. 
Limited spectral resolution. As it was shown in Chapter III very often having 
four spectral bands specific to multispectral imagery is not enough for 100% accurate 
detection and separation of various materials of interest on a scene. One of the solutions 
to this problem is utilization of hyperspectral imagery that has hundreds of narrow 
bands. Bigger number of bands provides a much better quality of spectral signatures, but 
this type of imagery has much lower spatial resolution than multispectral imagery. 
Besides, there are only few commercial sensors available and it is more expensive than 
other imagery types. 
High prices. Although prices of satellite imagery are constantly going down, 
significant budget is required in order to maintain a comprehensive library of imagery 
for various regions all over the world. This would be especially pressing for 
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organizations with limited resources like the IAEA, or academic societies like INMAC. 
As it was shown earlier in most cases additional types of data like multispectral, 
hyperspectral, radar or infrared are needed besides high-resolution images. These types 
of imagery are usually even more costly and increase the financial burden on research 
organizations. Another consideration should be when a country of interest is watched in 
progress (construction stages of a suspicious facility), then several images of the same 
place over the timeline would be needed and in some cases a special pass of a satellite 
over the place of interest has to be ordered. Maintaining an up-to-date and high quality 
imagery library can become a significant part of a monitoring organization’s budget. 
Visual signatures. Some of the nuclear fuel cycle facilities do not have distinct 
visual signatures that can be used for their identification. For example, there are no 
observables that would indicate the value of satellite imagery for the purpose of 
identification of undeclared fuel fabrication activities. Moreover, significant indicators 
would be unlikely even during construction of these facilities. Another example: one of 
the pitfalls of the gas centrifuge enrichment method is that a medium-sized warehouse or 
building can house a sufficient number of gas centrifuge cascades to produce one or 
more nuclear warheads per year. This makes uncovering enrichment facilities of 
potential proliferators more difficult. Unlike gaseous diffusion enrichment facilities, or 
even nuclear reactors that can produce plutonium, a typical gas centrifuge enrichment 
facility would not require the cooling or electrical systems that are readily visible in 
other types of enrichment facilities. 
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Spoofing techniques. There is a number of techniques that a potential proliferator 
may use to avoid detection. Commercial satellite imagery is available to everybody 
including potential proliferators. Knowing investigators capabilities and using those 
capabilities themselves, a state or organization constructing a covert facility, may 
develop several methods to try to avoid detection. 
1. Underground facilities. In order to hide signatures specific to nuclear fuel 
cycle facilities, a proliferator may choose to construct and underground 
facility. Only a few necessary infrastructures will appear on the surface of the 
ground. Another consideration for underground construction is a robust 
protection from air strikes. Detection of underground facilities is still possible 
during the construction phase.  
2. Inside hill or mountain facilities. In order to avoid detection of underground 
facility during the construction phase, a proliferator may choose to build a 
facility inside a hill or a mountain to mask the project as a mining operation. 
This type of construction will also provide a stronger air strike protection. As 
a disadvantage of such type of construction for the proliferator is an 
extremely high cost which, combined with combined with an average cost of 
nuclear fuel cycle facility, makes the total construction cost almost 
astronomical and affordable only to very reach states.  
3. Overcast skies and dark time of a day. Another trick that can be used to 
hide some illegal activities and truck or train movements is using overcast 
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skies and nighttime. In this case the only option for investigators is expensive 
radar and infrared thermal imagery. 
4. Camouflage. Camouflage technologies may be used to hide parts of 
infrastructure from being visible from space. Besides facility infrastructures 
usually means of protection, like antiaircraft guns, that may look suspicious 
around facility are camouflaged. In this case investigators should use 
multispectral or hyperspectral imagery for scene material analysis. 
5. Constructing confinement/containment buildings similar to civilian 
industrial facilities. Potential proliferator may choose to build a facility that 
looks similar to one of the civilian type factories, for example chemical 
plants. If carefully thought through, this trick may mislead investigators.   
6. Proximity to large civilian plants. Contrary to a trend of constructing covert 
facilities in distant non-populated areas, a proliferator may choose a location 
with a proximity to a large civilian plant. This type of location will allow a 
newly constructed covert facility to look like a part of civil industry and not 
raise suspicions.  
This list consists of just a few examples of spoofing techniques that may be used 
by nuclear nonproliferation regime violators in order to hide their illegal covert facilities.  
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VII.B.1. Iran’s Natanz Underground Uranium Enrichment Facility as an Example of an 
Attempt to Create an Undetectable Covert Facility  
One of the classic examples of a covert facility is the uranium enrichment 
centrifuge plant in Natanz, Iran. An original centrifuge plant was built above the ground 
and contained experimental centrifuge cascades for testing, research and personnel 
training. The second, newer, part of Natanz facility was created under ground, and 
recently after completion of “secret” centrifuge halls, was covered with dirt. The 
underground structure had raised a lot of questions and concerns. In response to these 
questions and concerns the Iranian Government issued a number of statements about the 
purpose of this facility. One of the first statements even described it as an agricultural 
facility. According to some sources there were also some plans to plant trees above the 
underground halls to mask them even more.  
Satellite imagery allows analyzing some of the spoofing techniques used by the 
creators of the plant along with several distinct signatures that can be used by 
investigators. One the recent satellite images of the facility from the Google Earth 
database is presented in Fig. 33. The only objects visible to an analyst on this image are: 
several medium size industrial buildings accompanied by an administrative complex 
(original centrifuge plant), security fence around them, piles of dirt and dump trucks 
outside the fence. More than likely without thorough analysis an analyst may decide that 
this plant is one of the civilian industrial facilities and continue the search. Another 
possible case is, if imagery analyst would be able to determine that buildings in the 
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image belong to a centrifuge uranium enrichment plant, the capacity of this plant would 
be significantly underestimated. 
 
 
Fig. 33. Iran’s Underground Uranium Enrichment Centrifuge Facility in Natanz. 
 
On the other hand there are several elements on this image that could provide 
evidence of a clandestine facility. These features should rise suspicion and result in more 
thorough investigation of the facility and its surroundings, including obtaining archived 
imagery to analyze various construction phases. One of these signatures is a secluded 
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remote location of this plant. Another is a set of antiaircraft guns forming an air defense 
perimeter. These guns are not readily visible on the image and can only be found after 
careful inspection of the plants surroundings. Large area next to the plant being covered 
with dirt could also raise some questions about the purpose of this facility. 
Iran’s uranium enrichment facility in Natanz is one of the spectacular examples 
of a covert facility. It is also an example of successful uncovering of a clandestine 
program. The intention for this plant was to create a large facility with only a few small 
buildings above the ground. Underground allocation would not only help to hide the real 
purpose and scale of the facility, but also would protect equipment from potential air 
strikes by thick layers of concrete and dirt. After the discovery of this plant, multiple 
images from different construction stages were studied that allowed assessing inside 
configuration of the underground part of the facility. 
VII.C. International Customs Documentation 
There are two main limitations associated with the use of customs data for 
tracking nonproliferation regime violations around the world: tremendous amount of 
data and limited access to documentation. Millions of shipments of various materials and 
machinery take place every day. Each transaction is registered in shipper’s, recipient’s, 
and all transition country’s databases. Copies of all shipping paperwork are also stored 
in these databases. Tremendous amount of data generated over time poses a problem of 
creating a suitable and fast search engine that would allow information extraction in a 
timely manner. 
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Another potential problem might be in acquiring access to the data. Theoretically 
and organization like INMAC can request access to the database of a country that is 
suspected to be involved in shipment of illegal materials. In reality information owner 
may decline the request or provide only a limited access to the database. This scenario is 
likely to happen when only several outcast countries are involved in a transaction. 
There are also a number of spoofing techniques that can be used by proliferator 
to hide real intentions and mislead investigators. For example Iraq had established 
different "procurement channels" within its nuclear weapons program. The goal of these 
channels was to avoid attracting attention to the large quantities of materials and 
equipment the government needed for nuclear weapons projects, and to tailor the 
proposed channel to the type of item needed. Iraq's central procurement office often 
divided a project's list of desired items into different lists comprised of items taken from 
several distinct project lists. In this way, the resulting lists of equipment would not have 
any resemblance to the original lists. Thus, the final lists would be less likely to raise 
suspicions among foreign intelligence agencies, which can spend a considerable effort in 
analyzing exports looking for patterns suggesting secret technical nuclear projects [85]. 
VII.D. Press Reports 
Press reports have several major disadvantages as a resource for open-source 
investigation. First, similarly to the customs data, it is a tremendous amount of 
information. Special search engine is needed for effective browsing and selection of 
related to the subject of investigation reports. Second is limited access to newspaper and 
news releases archives. Although currently more and more newspapers are becoming 
149 
available online, it is still more exclusive to developed democratic states. Also usually 
only state’s central or federal news agencies publish their material on the internet. Small 
local newspapers, which in many cases become a more valuable resource, can only be 
found in paper in the area of origin.  
There are several ways a potential proliferator may use press reports for the 
purposes of misleading investigators. Fake news announcement or press release is the 
most possible spoofing technique. For example, when a construction of a new facility 
starts a press release would announce that it is a new chemical plant for fertilizer 
production, when it is, in fact, a uranium conversion plant.  
VII.E. CTBT Network Data 
Currently the main disadvantage of CTBT Network data is that it is not available 
to general public. If it was accessible, the “resolution” (the average distance between 
adjacent monitoring stations) of the network might not always be sufficient for the 
purposes of investigation. CTBT Network was originally designed to detect nuclear 
explosions, when a significant amount of radioactive fission products would be released 
into the atmosphere. In case of a small-scale nuclear facility radioactive material release 
concentrations might be too small, or the closest monitoring station might too far, for 
detection to take place.   
VII.F. Conclusions 
As new methods of detection and monitoring are being developed, new tricks and 
spoofing technologies will also be developed by proliferators. It is very important for 
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investigation organizations, like INMAC, to consider and determine potential spoofing 
techniques. One way is to investigate methods currently used by violators. Another, and 
probably the most effective one, is for investigators to think what they would do if they 
were proliferators. Knowing investigation resources, it is possible to come up with a 
number of things that a real proliferator would consider. Then generated ideas should be 
analyzed and, if possible, methods of detection should be developed. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSIONS 
The main goal of this project was to prove the feasibility of formation of an 
International Nonproliferation Monitoring Academic Community (INMAC). This 
community would utilize all publicly and commercially available sources of information 
for the purpose of detecting covert facilities and activities intended for the unlawful 
acquisition of fissile material or production of nuclear weapons. Ultimately formation of 
such organization would provide necessary aid and resources to the IAEA and would 
strengthen the international nuclear nonproliferation regime as a whole.   
The availability and use of commercial satellite imagery systems, commercial 
computer codes for satellite imagery analysis, CTBT verification International 
Monitoring System, publicly available information sources such as watchdog groups, 
press reports, scientific and technical literature, and Custom Services information were 
explored. The results proved that publicly and commercially available sources of 
information and data analysis can be a powerful tool in tracking violations in the 
international nuclear nonproliferation regime. It was also shown that the best result can 
be achieved by integrating information from all available sources. 
During the satellite imagery analysis study panchromatic and multispectral 
images of several known and unknown nuclear installations were investigated. A set of 
signatures specific to various nuclear fuel cycle facilities was defined. These features 
allow distinguishing nuclear installations from other types of industrial facilities. In 
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addition to the facility type, applicability of satellite imagery for determination of 
specific characteristics, such as production capacity or electric power consumption, was 
explored. Investigation of a blind case scenario proved the applicability of defined visual 
signatures for detection and characterization of the nuclear installations. 
Open-source investigation of the Libyan nuclear weapons program and its 
attempts to acquire uranium centrifuge technology was described. The level of detail of 
information compiled from the full variety of publicly available sources of information 
serves as another proof for the viability of members of academia performing 
open-source investigation for nonproliferation regime monitoring. 
Successful formation and operation of an international community of academics 
requires an effective mechanism of interaction and information exchange between the 
members of the community. As a part of this research project the structure for INMAC 
was proposed. A framework for the open-source investigation, interaction between 
various research groups within the community, and integration of data from the wide 
variety of publicly and commercially available sources of information was created. Also, 
the means for controlling data confidence and estimating country’s progress in 
developing a covert nuclear weapons program were selected. 
The last part of this work involved exploring various methods and techniques 
that can be used by a potential proliferator to avoid detection of a secret weapons 
program. Identifying the weaknesses of open-source monitoring of nonproliferation 
regime would help in selecting new research areas that would stimulate development of 
new verification and data search techniques and ultimately improve the “open-source 
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intelligence”. The majority of these research projects can be carried out within the 
proposed community of academics. 
The future work on this project would include an expanded study of commercial 
satellite imagery. This study would explore the integration of analysis results of all 
available remote sensor technologies: panchromatic, multispectral, hyperspectral, 
thermal and radar. Also, new image recognition techniques together with innovative 
methods of indexing and retrieving high-resolution image regions in large geospatial 
data libraries should be explored. 
Another part of the future research would be in performing an open-source 
investigation of a well-known case only with the help of the publicly available sources 
that were available before a certain date (for example, the date of public announcement 
of the covert program). This type of investigation would help in identifying the amount 
of information that was available and what could be compiled before clandestine 
activities were officially revealed to the public. 
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APPENDIX A 
FULL SCENE CLASSIFICATION RESULTS 
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Fig. A-1. Full Scene: Gramm-Schmidt Sharpening, Bilinear/Average Resampling, Binary Encoding Classification 
(FGBABO00.img). 
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Fig. A-2. Full Scene: Gramm-Schmidt Sharpening, Bilinear/Average Resampling, Maximum Likelihood Classification 
(FGBALO00.img). 
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Fig. A-3. Full Scene: Gramm-Schmidt Sharpening, Bilinear/Average Resampling, Parallelepiped Classification 
(FGBAPO00.img). 
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Fig. A-4. Full Scene: Gramm-Schmidt Sharpening, Bilinear/Average Resampling, Spectral Angle Mapper Classification 
(FGBASO00.img). 
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Fig. A-5. Full Scene: Gramm-Schmidt Sharpening, Bilinear/Sensor Resampling, Parallelepiped Classification (FGBSPO00.img). 
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Fig. A-6. Full Scene: Gramm-Schmidt Sharpening, Bilinear/Sensor Resampling, Spectral Angle Mapper Classification 
(FGBSSO00.img). 
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Fig. A-7. Full Scene: Gramm-Schmidt Sharpening, Cubic Convolution/Average Resampling, Parallelepiped Classification 
(FGCAPO00.img). 
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Fig. A-8. Full Scene: Gramm-Schmidt Sharpening, Cubic Convolution/Average Resampling, Spectral Angle Mapper 
Classification (FGCASO00.img). 
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Fig. A-9. Full Scene: Gramm-Schmidt Sharpening, Cubic Convolution/Sensor Resampling, Parallelepiped Classification 
(FGCSPO00.img). 
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Fig. A-10. Full Scene: Gramm-Schmidt Sharpening, Cubic Convolution/Sensor Resampling, Spectral Angle Mapper 
Classification (FGCSSO00.img).
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APPENDIX B 
REPROCESSING PLANT CONSTRUCTION SITE CLASSIFICATION 
RESULTS 
  
173
 
Fig. B-1. Reprocessing Plant: Gramm-Schmidt Sharpening, Bilinear/Average Resampling, Mahalanobis Distance 
Classification (RGBADO00.img). 
  
174
 
Fig. B-2. Reprocessing Plant: Gramm-Schmidt Sharpening, Cubic Convolution/Average Resampling, Mahalanobis Distance 
Classification (RGCADO00.img). 
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Fig. B-3. Reprocessing Plant: Gramm-Schmidt Sharpening, Cubic Convolution/Sensor Resampling, Mahalanobis Distance 
Classification (RGCSDO00.img).
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